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 Drawing from recent experiences in the US, UK, and EU, this article examines 
regulatory analysis of corporate law policies. It suggests that regulatory analysis, as 
currently understood and applied in this area, suffers from severe weaknesses. The effects 
of proposed corporate law policies are often particularly difficult to predict and even more 
difficult to quantify, which negatively impacts analytical reliability. Moreover, given its 
nature and interconnections with politics, corporate law is less amenable to purely 
technocratic assessments than other areas of law. Based on three case studies, the article 
explores these problems. It outlines a revised ‘procedural’ view, suggesting that regulatory 
analysis in corporate law should be understood primarily as a process for enhancing 
information, transparency, and monitoring, independently from specific normative criteria. 
This leads to several implications. In short, regulatory analysis should combine quantified 
analysis with leeway for regulatory judgment and focus on increased consultation, critical 
engagement, review, and transparency as the dominant guiding factors. 
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(A) INTRODUCTION 
Legislatures and regulators in many countries have long been required to assess ex ante the 
potential consequences of proposed laws and regulations through various forms of 
regulatory analysis (hereinafter ‘RA’)1. Only upon a satisfactory outcome of these analyses 
may regulators implement new laws, underscoring the importance of RA in the legislative 
process. In particular due to its strong quantitative elements, RA has attracted both 
academic support and criticism. This article contributes to this discussion, focusing 
however on a more recent development, in which RA has begun to affect core areas of 
corporate and corporate governance law2. Drawing from selected case studies in the United 
States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union, the article thus explores the 
application and avenues for further development of RA in the corporate law context, which 
despite its significance has not previously been examined in the UK.  
                                                 
1 See C. Radaelli & F. de Francesco, Regulatory Impact Assessment, in: The Oxford Handbook of 
Regulation, R. Baldwin et al., eds. (Oxford: OUP, 2010) 279 (stating that RA ‘has spread 
throughout the globe’); R. Baldwin et al., Understanding Regulation (Oxford: OUP, 2012) 315–
319. For example, almost every OECD member state has now adopted some form of RA. 
‘Regulatory Impact Analysis,’ http://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/ria.htm. 
2 In this article, the term ‘corporate law’ will be used in a broad sense, encompassing both 
traditional corporate (or ‘company’) law and ‘corporate governance law’. On the potential 
differences between these two and related terminology, see M. T. Moore, Corporate Governance in 
the Shadow of the State (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2013) 12–14. As such, ‘corporate law’ may also 
overlap with aspects of financial and securities regulation, such as evidenced by the SEC’s proxy 
access rule, which related to board composition and will be discussed below. 
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 The article proceeds as follows: In order to provide a foundational basis, the first part 
begins by defining the concept of RA and outlining the legal frameworks within which it 
operates in the three jurisdictions. This part also discusses various functions that are most 
commonly attributed to RA in general.  
 In the second part, the article shifts to an examination of three recent examples. First, it 
considers the US Securities and Exchange Commission’s rule on proxy access and its 
controversial cost-benefit analysis of provisions designed to affect the composition of 
corporate boards. Second, the article explores the role of RA in the UK’s latest executive 
remuneration reforms, which entail the question of which corporate constituency should be 
ultimately in charge of executives’ salaries. Third, RA will be discussed in the context of 
EU provisions on non-financial corporate disclosure, an area that in part touches upon 
contentious corporate social responsibility questions.  
 Drawing from an analysis of these case studies, the article’s final part provides an 
assessment of RA in corporate law. It suggests that while this tool may be useful, the 
inherent uncertainties in measuring the impact of corporate law policies as well as the 
biases affecting RA mean that its role is different from what it is often perceived. In 
contrast to other areas with a more ‘scientific’ basis and (to a certain extent) ex ante 
measurable effects, such as health and safety law, the consequences of proposed corporate 
law policies – which have no connection to physical ‘laws of nature’ – are particularly 
difficult to predict and quantify. Contentious issues therefore may need to be decided based 
at least in part on expert or regulatory judgment. Moreover, and relatedly, corporate law is 
to a large degree influenced by politics, and regulatory analysis is embedded in the political 
process, which frames outcomes and is difficult to reconcile with purely ‘evidence-based’ 
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lawmaking that is apolitical and technocratic in nature. Indeed, it creates a risk that RA may 
be deployed to clothe political judgments in the garb of technocratic neutrality.  
 While this article focuses on and adds to the literature on RA in corporate and financial 
law as key aspects of ‘economic regulation’,3 there are other sectors with similar 
characteristics. The analysis and recommendations developed in this article can therefore be 
applied more broadly. The dividing line between areas that are more amenable to traditional 
RA – such as health and safety – and those that are not – such as corporate and financial 
law – can arguably be drawn based on the extent to which definite, exogenous factors or 
principles form the input for an assessment.4 In corporate and financial law, fewer such 
exogenous factors are available.5 Moreover, this area is characterised by its strong impact 
on various branches of the economy, intersections with societal and political issues, and its 
                                                 
3 See F. Chittenden et al., Impact Assessment in the EU, in: Better Regulation, S. Weatherill, ed 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007) 272, defining ‘economic regulation’ as encompassing ‘regulations 
that seek to alter the commercial and financial frameworks and markets’. 
4 See text to n 153–160 (discussing, in part, Jeffrey Gordon’s arguments in this respect). In these 
areas, it may also be possible to conduct experiments, which is not an option in other fields.  
5 Other examples (based on the policy areas for UK impact assessments) that may suffer from 
comparable problems in terms of RA include arts and culture; community and society; equality, 
rights and citizenship; foreign affairs; and trade and investment.  
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particularly dynamic nature.6 These factors make corporate law RA especially challenging 
– although not ‘sui generis’7 – and amplify problems that are also present in other areas.     
 Against this background, the article suggest that rather than a mechanical method to 
unearth the ‘best’ possible laws according to a normative criterion (such as varying 
conceptions of ‘efficiency’ or ‘fairness’), RA should be conceptualised as mainly a 
procedural and informational tool that supplements open consideration of the political and 
policy judgments that underpin regulatory choices. As such, and contrary to common views 
of RA, the tool’s main functions are increasing transparency and information for the public 
and regulators alike, providing participatory opportunities for interested parties, and 
facilitating monitoring of regulators.  The article thereby offers an alternative viewpoint to 
recent scholarly works that either support or propose to abolish the current regime of RA in 
corporate and financial law. To conclude, the article discusses the revised view’s normative 
consequences and measures to improve and better align RA with its model. 
                                                 
6 See J. C. Coates, ‘Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and Implications’ 
(2015) 124 Yale Law Journal 882, 998–1003.  
7 On this, see also E. A. Posner & E. G. Weyl, ‘Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: A 
Response to Criticisms’ (2015) 124 Yale Law Journal Forum 246, available at 
 http://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/Posner-WeylPDF_ijby4z9e.pdf (countering arguments that CBA in 
financial regulation is different from other fields).  
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(A) BACKGROUND 
(B) Terminology 
At the outset of this article, it is important to define RA as the subject matter at hand. The 
use of terminology in this area tends to be inconsistent, with at times overlapping concepts.  
The most commonly known method for assessing the impact of regulatory measures is 
cost-benefit analysis (‘CBA’). Traditionally, CBA has a strong emphasis on monetary 
quantification. Originally, CBA was used in large infrastructure project evaluation.8 As 
such and in its strict sense, it serves the purpose of assessing proposed ventures by 
calculating their net present value or ‘net benefit’ as derived from a project’s expected 
positive and negative cash flows.9 Only projects whose benefits outweigh their costs (that is 
have positive net benefits) would normally be found viable and worthwhile pursuing. 
 Subsequently, CBA found its way into the regulatory toolbox. In this context, the term 
CBA is now used in different ways. It can still refer to a rigid method of weighing 
quantitative costs and benefits of policy choices, with a view to identifying the option with 
                                                 
8 A. C. M. Meuwese, Impact Assessment in EU Lawmaking (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law 
International, 2008) 63; OECD, ‘Cost-Benefit Analysis  and the Environment: Executive Summary’ 
(2006) 16, available at http://www.oecd.org/greengrowth/tools-evaluation/36190261.pdf. 
9 See OECD, n 8 above, 16. See also D. M. Driesen, ‘Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Neutral?’ (2006) 77 
Colorado Law Review 335 (defining regulatory CBA as an estimate ‘of the regulation’s costs and of 
the monetary value economists associate with the harms the regulation will avoid’). 
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the highest net benefits.10 However, CBA is also used in a more ‘casual’ or broader sense, 
in which costs and benefits are considered but the end result is not necessarily geared 
towards net benefits. This can be referred to as a ‘cost-benefit approach’,  which entails 
‘assessing a proposal in terms of its consequences in a consistent manner, albeit one that 
accepts the logic of detrimental effects and beneficial effects’ and includes a qualitative or 
quantitative description of these effects.11 Alternatively, CBA itself can be defined in a way 
that allows for a consideration of qualitative and distributive aspects.12  
 Upon closer examination, it becomes evident that what is referred to as CBA in the 
regulatory context is frequently farther removed from strict CBA and closer to a broader 
                                                 
10 Compare, for example, the D.C. Circuit’s references to ‘net benefits’ in its evaluation of an SEC 
cost-benefit analysis in Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1153, 1155 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
This decision will be discussed in more detail further below. 
11 Meuwese, n 8 above, 63. In a similar, albeit critical vein, two scholars have recently used the 
concept of an ‘informal cost benefit analysis,’ which they characterise as ‘an approach that 
recognises the presence of costs and benefits and acknowledges that regulation’s benefits ought to 
exceed its costs but do not actually try to measure whether they do.’ O. Ben-Shahar & C. E. 
Schneider, ‘The Futility of Cost Benefit Analysis in Financial Disclosure Regulation’ (2014) 43 
Journal of Legal Studies S253, S254. 
12 R. W. Hahn & C. R. Sunstein, ‘A New Executive Order for Improving Federal Regulation? 
Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis’ (2002) 150 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1489, 
1498–1499. See also M. D. Adler & E. A. Posner, ‘Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis’ (1999) 109 
Yale Law Journal 165, 172, noting that distributional considerations are external to ordinary CBA, 
whereas more ambitious versions may incorporate more sophisticated distributional weightings. 
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cost-benefit approach.13 Moreover, CBA should not be – but often is – confused or used 
interchangeably with the terms ‘impact analysis’, ‘impact assessment’, ‘regulatory 
assessment’ and similar labels.14 In the US, for instance, the analyses that many agencies 
are required to conduct may be referred to as ‘Impact Statements’ or ‘Regulatory Impact 
Analyses.’15 In the EU and UK, the official expression for the method of evaluating the 
consequences of regulatory policies is now ‘Impact Assessment.’16 
                                                 
13 For instance, as one commentator has noted, the EU Commission’s impact analyses normally use 
a cost-benefit approach, not traditional or ‘strict’ CBA. Meuwese, n 8 above, 63. 
14 See also H. Pierce, ‘Economic Analysis by Federal Financial Regulators’(2013) 9 Journal of 
Law, Economics  & Policy 569, 569 n 2 (‘[C]ost-benefit analysis and benefit-cost analysis are 
commonly used as substitutes for economic analysis and regulatory analysis but … a thorough 
regulatory analysis entails much more than simply weighing the costs and benefits of a proposed 
regulation.’). 
15 See, for example, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, ‘Regulatory Impact Analysis: A 
Primer’, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/regpol/circular-a-
4_regulatory-impact-analysis-a-primer.pdf; Office of Management and Budget, ‘Circular A-4’ 
(2003), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a004_a-4.  
16 A. Alemanno & A. Meuwese, ‘Impact Assessment of EU Non-Legislative Rulemaking: The 
Missing Link in the “New Comitology”’ (2013) 19 European Law Journal 76; Minister of State for 
Employment Relations and Postal Affairs, ‘Regulatory Impact Assessments: 1st January to 30th 
June 2007’ 1, available at 
 www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/243114/7297.pdf 
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 These concepts may include the balancing of costs and benefits, but are different in 
substance from what is traditionally called CBA. They generally allow for a broader view 
that goes far beyond the balancing of costs and benefits. Notably, such analyses also tend to 
place greater weight on qualitative considerations and may also focus on factors such as 
sustainability, environmental, and humanitarian or societal effects. They are therefore 
different from rigid cost-benefit balancing and purely net benefit-focused methodologies.17 
 In this article, the term RA will generally be used to refer collectively to the various 
methods and processes by which regulators assess laws and regulations in a structured 
manner, including CBA as well as the more encompassing concepts that fall under the 
terms cost-benefit approach, regulatory impact analysis, regulatory statement, and impact 
analysis. Moreover, the terms ‘regulation’ and ‘regulator’ should be understood in a broad 
sense that includes laws and legislative bodies, respectively.  
                                                 
17 Indeed, as a recent EU commissioned study has noted, CBA is only one of many methodologies 
that can be used in conducting RA. Other methods, including cost-effectiveness analysis, least cost 
analysis, and various forms of multi-criteria analysis, can be more appropriate depending on the 
specific circumstances. A. Renda et al., Assessing the Costs and Benefits of Regulation (Brussels, 
2013) 202. 
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(B) Frameworks 
RA has its roots in the US, where it has been long embedded in the legal system18 and all 
three branches of government have engaged in various forms of cost-benefit balancing.19 
Nevertheless, in the US context, RA now mostly pertains to the rulemaking process by 
agencies.20 Modern RA first emerged in the 1970s as a reaction to growing regulation in the 
environmental, health, and safety areas.21 Subsequently, it evolved in most part through 
legislation and a series of presidential executive orders that require most executive 
                                                 
18 The comparison of costs and benefits by federal agencies dates back to at least the beginning of 
the 20th century, growing rapidly in importance over time. See P. Rose & C. Walker, The 
Importance Of Cost-Benefit Analysis In Financial Regulation (2013), Report for the US Chamber of 
Commerce, 3–4, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2231314; Adler & Posner, n 12 above, 169–
170; Hahn & Sunstein, n 12 above, 1505. 
19 See Rose & Walker, n 18 above, 4, 10. As evidenced by the famous Hand formula, cost-benefit 
considerations even extend to areas such as judicial definitions of the standard of care in tort law. 
United States v. Carroll Towing Co. 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d. Cir. 1947). For a more UK-centred 
discussion of the roots and development of CBA, see D. Pearce, ‘Cost-Benefit Analysis and 
Environmental Policy’ (1998) 14 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 84. 
20 See Radalli & de Francesco, n 1 above, 281, discussing RA in the United States in the context of 
delegated rulemaking and, following from this, through the lens of principal agent theory.  
21 G. F. Bishop & M. A. Coffee, ‘A Tale of Two Commissions, A Compendium of the Cost-Benefit 
Analysis Requirements Faced by the SEC & CFTC’ (2013) 32 Review of Banking & Financial Law 
565, 571; J. D. Guynn, ‘The Political Economy of Financial Rulemaking after Business 
Roundtable’ (2013) 99 Virginia Law Review 641, 644. 
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departments and agencies to conduct RA and have mandated a centralised cost-benefit 
monitor, the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in the Office of Management and 
Budget, with reviewing these analyses.22  
 Most recently, President Obama’s 2011 executive order reaffirmed, and in part 
modified, the governing principles.23 Notably, the executive order now adds that where 
appropriate and permitted by law, agencies may consider and discuss qualitatively values 
that are difficult or impossible to quantify, including equity, human dignity, fairness, and 
distributive impacts.24 In addition to the Presidential Orders, further guidance can be found 
in legislative instruments and internal guidelines, such as the ones issued by the SEC25.  
                                                 
22 See Bishop & Coffee, n 21 above, 571–576; J. N. Gordon, ‘The Empty Call for Benefit-Cost 
Analysis in Financial Regulation’(2014) 43 Journal of Legal Studies 351, 355–358; Pierce, n 14 
above, 571–572. 
23 Executive Order 13,563 (2011) 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 s 1(a)–(b).   
24 ibid s 1(c). This modification is particularly useful in situations where the regulator is required to 
pursue social or humanitarian objectives – such as in the US conflict minerals rule (see n 62 below) 
– and where previously only efficiency-based assessment criteria would have been permissible, 
leading to potential legal issues due to the divergence between regulatory goals and RA principles. 
For a critique of the new rules, see E. A. Posner, ‘Obama’s Cost-Benefit Revolution’ (2014) The 
Republic, available at http://www.newrepublic.com/article/81990/obama-cost-benefit-revolution 
(suggesting that attempts to soften CBA’s focus on quantification are problematic). 
25 US Securities and Exchange Commission, Current Guidance on Economic Analysis in SEC 
Rulemaking (2012), available at 
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 RA, in the form of ‘Impact Assessments,’ has now also ‘taken centre stage in the 
preparation of legislation, rules and policies in the context of the EU over the last decade.’26 
Impact assessments are part of the EU’s broader ‘Better Regulation’ (now called ‘Smart 
Regulation’) initiative, which aims to improve and ensure the effectiveness of EU 
policies.27 Initially only a ‘pre-political decision-making’ tool that the EU Commission 
used to prepare legislative proposals and broader policy initiatives, the scope of RA has 
been extended to include non-legislative EU rulemaking.28 Also, in addition to its use at 
Commission level, RA is conducted by the European Parliament and European Council, 
with the different bodies’ analyses being coordinated by an intra-institutional agreement.29  
                                                                                                                                                    
 https://www.sec.gov/divisions/riskfin/rsfi_guidance_econ_analy_secrulemaking.pdf; National 
Center for Environmental Economics, Guidelines for Preparing Economic Analyses (2014), 
available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eerm.nsf/vwAN/EE-0568-50.pdf/$file/EE-0568-50.pdf. 
26 Alemanno & Meuwese, n 16 above, 76. 
27 For an overview and key documents, see the European Commission’s Smart Regulation portal at 
http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/index_en.htm. On the development of the better regulation 
movement and its implications, see R. Baldwin, ‘Is better regulation smarter regulation?’ (2005) 
Public Law 485. 
28 Alemanno & Meuwese, n 16 above, 76–79. See also European Commission, Impact Assessment 
Guidelines (2009) SEC(2009) 92 [hereinafter IA Guidelines 2009], which state that generally, 
impact assessments ‘are necessary for the most important Commission initiatives and those which 
will have the most far-reaching impacts’. 
29 The European Parliament and Council have committed to conducting their own impact 
assessments on substantive amendments to proposals submitted by the EU Commission. See Inter-
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 RA in the EU is in large part governed by the Commission’s Impact Assessment 
Guidelines.30 Key elements of an impact analysis under the Guidelines are a definition of 
the problem and reasons for intervention, the policy objectives that are being pursued and 
intended effects, the policy options that have been considered, the assessment of 
monetisable and non-monetisable impacts, a discussion and comparison of the options – 
including the option of ‘doing nothing’ –, and proposals for monitoring and evaluation.31  
The assessment is preceded by a consultation process for interested parties and the 
gathering of relevant expertise and data. The findings are presented in a draft report, which, 
after further scrutiny, will result in a final report and adopted proposal.32  
 The EU, similar to the US, also has an independent and centralised system to monitor 
RA, the Impact Assessment Board (IAB).33 The Board ‘aims to improve the quality of the 
Commission’s impact assessments by strengthening quality control and providing advice 
and support’ and has a mandate to ‘examine all impact assessments, which accompany 
                                                                                                                                                    
Institutional Common Approach to Impact Assessment (IA), available at http://ec.europa.eu/smart-
regulation/impact/ia_in_other/docs/ii_common_approach_to_ia_en.pdf. 
30 IA Guidelines 2009, n 28 above. Note that there is an ongoing project in place to revise the 
current Guidelines. See 2014 Revision of the European Commission Impact Assessment Guidelines 
– Public Consultation Document, Annex I, available at http://ec.europa.eu/smart-
regulation/impact/docs/iag_pc_questionnaire_en.pdf. 
31 IA Guidelines 2009, n 28, Part II. 
32 ibid 7–12. 
33 See generally European Commission, Impact Assessment Board Report for 2013 (2013) 1–3, 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/impact/key_docs/docs/iab_report_2013_en.pdf. 
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Commission initiatives with signiﬁcant impacts.’34 Among other tasks, the Board issues 
recommendations on draft impact assessment reports. In principle, the Board’s positive 
opinion is needed for an initiative to be tabled for adoption by the Commission. 
 The UK, like other EU member states, also relies increasingly on RA as part of its 
‘Better Regulation’ framework. In 2007, the government replaced ‘Regulatory Impact 
Assessments’ with a revised ‘Impact Assessment’ tool, with a view to have a ‘simpler, 
more transparent process that will be embedded in the earliest stage of policy making.’35  
 UK impact assessments are conducted by governmental departments and executive 
agencies,36 as a matter of ‘good practice’ or, as the case may be, specific statutory or other 
requirements.37 Assessments are generally required for all forms of intervention, including 
primary or secondary (delegated) legislation as well as codes of practice or guidance. 
Although previously focused on regulations, including proposed European legislation, that 
were expected to increase or decrease costs on businesses, the third sector, or the public 
                                                 
34 Impact Assessment Board (IAB) Mandate, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/iab/docs/iab_mandate_annex_sec_2006_1457_3.pdf. 
35 Minister of State for Employment Relations and Postal Affairs, Regulatory Impact Assessments: 
1st January to 30th June 2007 (2008) 1. 
36 HM Treasury, The Green Book – Appraisal and Evaluation in Central Government (2003) 8. 
37 See, for example, Section 5A of the Utilities Act 2000, inserted by section 6 of the Sustainable 
Energy Act 2003, which requires the gas and electricity markets authority to carry out impact 
assessments. 
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sector,38 the contemporary approach broadens the requirement for impact assessments to 
include policies that have an effect on the public or third parties.39  
 Guidance on how to conduct impact assessments is provided in documents such as the 
Green Book,40 the Practical Guidance for UK Government Officials,41 as well as in specific 
internal guidelines.42 In terms of substance, impact assessments at the UK level are similar 
to their EU level counterparts.43 UK impact assessments also go through several stages, 
                                                 
38 See HM Government, Impact Assessment Guidance – When to do an Impact Assessment (2011) 1 
(on file with author; the document has recently been removed from the government’s website and is 
subject to change); Green Book, n 36 above, 8 (stating that ‘the trigger for producing an RIA is that 
the proposal could affect businesses, charities or the voluntary sector’). 
39 See Department for Business, Innovation & Skills (hereinafter BIS), Better Regulation 
Framework Manual – Practical Guidance for UK Government Officials (2015) 56 (defining an 
impact assessment in part as a tool ‘to help develop policy by assessing and presenting the likely 
costs and benefits and the associated risks of a proposal that might have an impact on the public, 
business or civil society organisations, the environment and wider society’). 
40 Green Book, n 36 above. 
41 BIS, n 39 above. 
42 For example, Ofgem, Impact Assessment Guidance (2013), available at 
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgem-publications/83550/impactassessmentguidance.pdf. 
43 See the official impact assessment template at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/278558/impact-
assessment-template.dot. 
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including a consultation stage with interested parties and a review stage that culminates in 
the (non-binding) opinion by a reviewing body, the Regulatory Policy Committee.44 
(A) FUNCTIONS 
At first glance, the idea of analysing the consequences of proposed policies makes intuitive 
sense and seems not to require further explanation. Nevertheless, identifying the precise 
justification for conducting RA has proven elusive, and even its utility is controversial. 
Thus, this part aims to provide a cross-jurisdictional overview of functions commonly 
attributed to RA.45 It should be kept in mind, however, that functions may differ depending 
on the specific context and that the lines between some of them tend to be blurred. 
                                                 
44 See generally Regulatory Policy Committee: Business Plan 2013-14 (2012), available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/253940/RPC-
Business-Plan-2013-14_copy.pdf. It should be noted that the RPC’s involvement is now initiated at 
an early stage, allowing the Committee to continuously work with departments as they produce 
their assessments. 
45 The following builds in part on Robert Ahdieh’s exploration of the regulatory functions of CBA. 
R. B. Ahdieh, ‘Reanalyzing Cost-Benefit Analysis: Toward a Framework of Function(s) and 
Form(s)’ (2013) 88 New York University Law Review 1983, 2009–2023. For an overview of 
additional perspectives, see C. Dunlop et al., ‘The many uses of regulatory impact assessment: A 
meta-analysis of EU and UK cases’ (2012) 6 Regulation & Governance 23, 24–28. For the purpose 
of this article, it is worth pointing out that many functions attributed to CBA are applicable to RA 
generally, given that CBA can be interpreted broadly. See text to n 10–12 above.  
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(B) Efficiency and social welfare 
Given the prevalence of CBA as the default method to analyse regulatory actions, it is no 
surprise that a central function of RA is often seen as promoting ‘efficiency’, which is the 
traditional economic justification of CBA. In this regard, a distinction can be made between 
‘absolute efficiency’ and ‘relative efficiency’. The former is reflected in justifications of 
CBA that emphasise its potential to promote efficiency generally, whereas the latter – less 
ambitious explanation – pertains to conceptualisations of CBA that focus on its role in 
assisting regulators to choose the most efficient among several proposed policies.46  
 In any instance, the question then arises what constitutes efficiency. Traditionally, this 
is debated by reference to the familiar welfare economics concepts of Pareto or Kaldor-
Hicks efficiency, with the latter having formed the basis for modern CBA.47 Nevertheless, 
both concepts do not provide convincing justifications for CBA and, even less so, the 
broader concept of RA. In short, Pareto efficiency is unlikely to be achieved given its 
stringent requirements, while the normative value of Kaldor-Hicks optimality can be 
disputed given its reliance on solely hypothetical wealth transfers (but not real 
                                                 
46 On priority setting in CBA, see Ahdieh, n 45 above, 2014–2016. 
47 See Adler & Posner, n 12 above 169–170, 176–194; R.A. Posner, ‘Cost-Benefit Analysis: 
Definition, Justification, and Comment on Conference Paper’ (2000) 29 Journal of Legal Studies 
1153, 1153–1156. A project is (1) Pareto efficient if it does not produce any losers and at least one 
individual gains from it; and (2) Kaldor-Hicks efficient if, in a hypothetical costless lump-sum 
redistribution, those that gain from a project could compensate those that are worse off, leading to a 
Pareto efficient outcome as a result. 
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compensation).48 Moreover, even if CBA would be certain to advance efficiency (with the 
cost of conducting CBA included in the overall calculations), using efficiency alone as a 
guide may be unsuitable.  
 Thus, in light of these explanatory weaknesses, CBA has also been said to serve broader 
non-utilitarian goals. Adler and Posner have argued that CBA is properly understood as a 
welfarist tool that is justified by normative concerns, namely in the form of overall well-
being measured against adjusted individual preferences, not efficiency.49  
 As Adler and Posner explain, efficiency-based CBA would result in undesirable 
outcomes in instances such as where preferences are distorted because they are uninformed 
or objectively undesirable, or where a policy would result in substantial wealth 
differentials. First, because efficiency concepts are linked to actual (as opposed to informed 
and undistorted) individual preferences,50 a project may be deemed ‘efficient’ even if the 
underlying preferences suffer from defects. For example, a group of people may prefer a 
certain project based on misleading information that they were given. Unless they receive 
more complete information, the implemented project corresponds to their actual 
preferences and satisfies the efficiency requirement. Second, efficiency concepts fail to 
adjust for distortions caused by wealth distributions. Thus, assuming that a project results in 
substantial welfare gains for a small group and substantial welfare losses for a large group, 
                                                 
48 See Adler & Posner, n 12 above, 176–194 (rejecting traditional CBA justifications). 
49 ibid 194–216; M. D. Adler & E. A. Posner, ‘Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When 
Preferences are Distorted’ (2000) 29 Journal of Legal Studies 1105, 1108–1116. 
50 The ‘gains’ in Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency (see n 47 above) are commonly expressed in 
terms of a person’s actual preferences. Adler & Posner, n 49 above, 1105–1106. 
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the project can still be ‘efficient’ if the gains – even marginally – surmount the losses. 
However, this does not account for potential negative effects associated with creating 
increased wealth differentials. 
 In a similar vein, Hahn and Sunstein have noted that ‘[r]egulation should ordinarily 
promote social welfare, and while social welfare might be promoted by regulations that fail 
cost-benefit analysis, cost-benefit analysis is an imperfect but useful and administrable 
proxy for the inquiry into the social welfare question.’51 They also argue that distributional 
considerations should be taken into account, where appropriate, when CBA is carried out.52 
 Apart from these critiques, purely efficiency-based explanations also stand on weak 
ground for other reasons. At a basic and practical level, RA that exclusively relies on strict 
CBA would, without regard to any specific normative concerns, simply not allow projects 
to go forward whose costs exceed their benefits.53 This is reminiscent of the US approach 
and its formal requirement that benefits need to be larger than costs.54 Yet, even a strict net 
                                                 
51 Hahn & Sunstein, n 12 above, 1499. 
52 ibid 1500. 
53 See Driesen, n 9 above, 390–92 (discussing the ‘Optimality’ and ‘No Excess’ criteria of 
regulatory efficiency); Executive Order 13,563 (2011) 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (requiring that agencies 
‘consider’ costs and benefits). 
54 Conversely, the EU does not formally impose such a requirement, noting that impact assessments 
are decision-making aids, not a substitute for political judgments. See European Commission, 
‘Communication on Impact Assessment’ (2002) COM(2002) 3; I. Lianos & M. Fazeka, ‘The One 
and the Many: Elaborating a taxonomy of Impact Assessment practices in Europe’ (2014) CLES 
Research Paper Series, 1/2014, available at http://www.ucl.ac.uk/cles/research-paper-
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benefit requirement is not free from difficulties. Apart from potential problems with 
quantification, the issues here include that it is not always clear which persons’ benefits 
should be taken into account and, moreover, it may be questionable where and when costs 
and benefits should accrue in order to be deemed relevant.  
 For instance, in corporate law, should regulators focus solely on benefits for 
investors/shareholders or should they also include managers, employees, etc. in their 
analysis? What timeframe should be used in when conducting RA and should benefits that 
accrue abroad be taken into account?55 Moreover, regulatory practice shows that RA does 
not prevent policies whose estimated or actual costs exceed their benefits,56 which further 
refutes the feasibility of an efficiency-based function of RA. 
                                                                                                                                                    
series/research-papers/cles-1-2014 (agreeing with the definition of impact assessments as a strategic 
tool that influences public authorities). Nevertheless, in practice the US approach is also less strict. 
For instance, even the former SEC Commissioner Troy Paredes has recently remarked that 
‘sometimes cost-benefit analysis isn’t the thing that drives the decision-making.’ Symposium, JOBS 
Act: The Terrible Twos – General Solicitation and Crowdfunding, the Next Frontier of Securities 
Regulation, ‘Keynote Address’ (2015) 20 Fordham Journal of Corporate and Financial Law 338, 
340.  
55 The EU may include impacts that fall outside of its territory in its impact assessment 
considerations. Similarly, see the SEC’s recent Mineral Conflicts Rule, where the central benefit 
consisted of curbing human rights violations occurring abroad. Conflict Minerals Rule (2012) 77 
Fed. Reg. 56,274. 
56 Hahn & Sunstein, n 12 above, 1490–1494, provide a list of various US legislative projects, 
ranging from issues such as roadworker protection to air quality standards, with negative net 
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 Indeed, those who conduct and oversee RA do not adhere to a purely efficiency-driven 
or monetary net benefit approach. For instance, the US Office of Management and Budget 
advocates a mixed approach, combining a focus on social welfare improvements with 
priority setting and efficiency aspects.57 Similarly, UK impact assessments should cover the 
full range of economic, social and environmental effects, in line with the Green Book 
methodology.58 The Green Book expressly states that costs and benefits should be adjusted 
based on a distributional analysis and provides guidance on methodologies to be used in 
this respect,59 while the Better Regulation Framework further clarifies the nature of some of 
the social factors that departments should consider as part of an impact assessment. 
                                                                                                                                                    
benefits. See also E. A. Posner, ‘Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Positive 
Political Theory Perspective’ (2002) 68 University of Chicago Law Review 1137, 1182–1186 
(discussing inefficiency of regulations). The Office of Management and Budget reported that while 
the great majority of rules have net benefits, ‘over the last decade, a few rules have net costs, 
typically as a result of legal requirements’. Office of Management and Budget, Draft 2013 Report to 
Congress on the Benefits and Costs of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, 
and Tribal Entities 4, available at 
 http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg_regpol_reports_congress. 
57 See Office of Management and Budget, n 63 above, 4–5. Compare this with the OECD’s 
guidance on RA, which also refers to quality, efficiency, and social welfare functions. OECD, 
Building an Institutional Framework for Regulatory Impact Analysis – Guidance for Policymakers 
(2008) 7, 11, 14. 
58 Green Book, n 36 above, 8. 
59 ibid 24 and Annex 5. 
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including elements such as ‘social, wellbeing and health inequalities’, quality of life, 
impacts on human rights, and equality.60   
(B) Informational aspects and ‘quality’ 
RA regularly entails substantial data collection, consultations, analysis, and publications of 
various draft to final stage documents, which brings another potential function to the 
forefront. RA can serve as an informational and monitoring tool, both for regulators and 
interested stakeholders (subject, however, to the important limitations outlined in the next 
section). As such, RA can promote transparency and accountability and dialogue and 
control within the government as well as between the government and those affected by 
regulatory measures.61 Even if efficiency or social welfare cannot be effectively promoted 
by RA, its informational and related aspects would still constitute strong arguments in its 
favour.62 In this sense, RA can be understood as a control  mechanism in a multi-layered 
principal-agent system,63 or, more subtly, as an ‘information supply mechanism’ that 
facilitates policy debates.  
                                                 
60 BIS, n 39 above, 66–67. 
61 Ahdieh, n 45 above, 2019. Accountability relates to both the priorities that regulator pursue as 
well as the factors that are considered in designing policies. ibid 2021–2023.   
62 This idea is further explored below, see 000–000. 
63 See Radaelli & de Francesco, n 1 above, 281–288.  
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 Informational aspects of RA are particularly emphasised in the European context.64 EU 
impact assessments have been characterised as tools to enhance the amount and quality of 
information available to regulators and the public on the impacts of different policy 
options.65 According to the IA Guidelines, the EU impact assessment system 
helps the EU institutions to design better policies and laws; facilitates better-
informed decision making throughout the legislative process; ensures early 
coordination within the Commission; takes into account input from a wide range of 
external stakeholders, in line with the Commission’s policy of transparency and 
openness towards other institutions and the civil society; helps to ensure coherence 
of Commission policies and consistency with Treaty objectives …; improves the 
quality of policy proposals by providing transparency on the benefits and costs of 
different policy alternatives and helping to keep EU intervention as simple and 
effective as possible; and helps to ensure that the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality are respected, and to explain why the action being proposed is 
necessary and appropriate.66 
                                                 
64 Similar functions have been considered, albeit to a lesser degree, in the US. See, for example, 
Ahdieh, n 45 above, 2019–2022 on CBA’s role in promoting transparency and agency monitoring. 
It should be kept in mind that the informational aspects are in tension with distortions and biases 
that afflict RA, on which see 000–000.  
65 See Alemanno & Meuwese, n 16 above, 76–78; Meuwese, n 8 above, 41–49. 
66 IA Guidelines 2009, n 28 above, section 1.2. 
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 Thus, the drivers for RA in the EU have been said to be consultation, control and 
quality.67 The precise meaning of ‘quality’ in this context is unclear, although it seems to be 
based on the assumption that enhanced input into and transparency in policy decisions, 
combined with deeper quantitative analysis and emphasis on trade-offs, leads to better 
policies.68 While ‘better’ policies could also mean more efficient policies, efficiency 
functions are less pronounced in the EU.  In part driven by the desire ‘to avoid getting 
enmeshed in the American debate on the desirability of cost-benefit analysis as a tool for 
decision-making’, the EU’s impact assessment system is ‘only in the second instance … 
aimed at conditioning regulatory action to a positive cost-benefit balance’.69 Indeed, the IA 
                                                 
67 Alemanno & Meuwese, n 16 above, 77, 89–91. Control, in this context, refers mainly to the 
desire to ensure that delegated powers in rulemaking, which are subject to reduced parliamentary 
control, are exercised in line with the limits and objectives of the power-conferring act. It can also 
extend, however, to control over regulators as exercised by the public. 
68 See ibid. Conversely, as Robert Baldwin has argued, the EU’s ‘better regulation’ initiative, in 
which RA and improvements to the RA process play an important role, may not necessarily have 
the anticipated effect of improved or ‘smarter’ regulation due to limitations in which RA impacts 
regulatory processes. Baldwin, n 27 above, 501–507. Thus, Baldwin suggests among others to 
initiate RA as early as possible in the regulatory process and, additionally, to leverage review 
procedures to improve regulatory systems. ibid 507–511. In this latter regard, the present article’s 
revised view of RA is broadly in line with these proposals. See XXX–XXX.    
69 Alemanno & Meuwese, n 16 above, 78. Still, the IA Guidelines 2009 contain numerous 
references to ‘efficiency’, in particular in their guidance on comparing different policy options. 
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Guidelines suggest the use of various methods and a mix of quantitative and qualitative 
analysis.70  
 The EU’s approach to RA is in part also reflected in the UK’s approach. Until recently, 
the UK’s impact assessment guidance stated that ‘Impact Assessment is both a continuous 
process to help the policy-maker fully think through and understand the consequences of 
possible and actual Government interventions in the public, private and third sectors; and a 
tool to enable the Government to weigh and present the relevant evidence on the positive 
and negative effects of such interventions, including by reviewing the impact of policies 
after they have been implemented.’71 The guidance also explains that the preparation and 
publication of assessments ensure that those with an interest understand and can challenge 
government intervention, the potential impact of new policies on them and estimated costs 
and benefits, and that they can identify unintended consequences. 72 Similarly, the National 
Audit Office has defined the purpose of impact assessments as ‘to inform all stages of the 
policy making process’, that is from the initial steps to the final stages of monitoring and 
evaluation.73 The NAO has stated that ‘all stakeholders of the regulations … must see the 
[impact assessment] process as credible’74 and suggested using a framework that identifies 
                                                 
70 See IA Guidelines 2009, n 28 above, 45–47.  
71 HM Government, n 38 above, 3–4. 
72 ibid. 
73 National Audit Office, Evaluation of Regulatory Impact Assessments Compendium Report 2003-
04 (London: The Stationary Office, 2004) 3; see also Baldwin, n 27 above, 491 (explaining the 
informational, decision-making function of impact assessments). 
74 National Audit Office, n 73 above, 3. 
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a policy rationale and objectives, includes an appraisal of the likely impacts, and uses 
feedback gained from monitoring and evaluation feedback to inform future actions.75  
 Thus, while the EU and UK emphasise informational and procedural aspects of RA, 
positive and negative impacts – in other words, costs and benefits76 – are important. In 
particular, in practice the UK appears more cost-benefit driven in its impact assessments 
than the EU, and thus closer to the traditional US model.77 However, the role of RA, 
according to the official guidance documents, is primarily seen as focused on finding and 
presenting impacts and how they affect policy options, rather than a tool to enhance 
efficiency in a strict economic sense. Nevertheless, it is challenging to ‘go against the 
numbers’78 and regulators will find it difficult to justify policies that lack net benefits.79  
                                                 
75 See ibid 10 and 16–39.  
76 The preferred term in the EU and UK is ‘positive and negative impacts’ instead of ‘costs and 
benefits.’ Nevertheless, ultimately, it is difficult to draw a clear line between the two concepts.  
77 See OECD, Sustainability in Impact Assessments – A Review of Impact Assessments in selected 
OECD countries and the European Commission (2012), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/Sustainability%20in%20impact%20assessment%20SG-
SD(2011)6-FINAL.pdf, 24 (stating that ‘[t]he British IA process is clearly based on CBA’). 
78 See generally, T.M. Porter, Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public 
Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995) (with a focus on CBA in chapter 7).  
79 A side effect of this may be that regulators increase estimates of benefits or, alternatively, put 
greater emphasis on non-monetised impacts to avoid quantification. Both effects can be observed in 
the case studies that will be discussed below. 
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(B) Bias-reduction and promotion 
Sunstein and others have emphasised RA’s function as a tool to reduce cognitive biases in 
public assessments and on the part of regulators. Indeed, given its structured and systematic 
approach, it is very plausible that proper RA can mitigate false or distorted perceptions, 
such as about the magnitude and probability of certain risks and benefits.80 For instance, 
due to heuristics and biases, public opinion may favour regulation that has high costs and 
low benefits, or neglect to focus on costs and benefits that are not clearly visible. Examples 
for this are skewed perceptions of risks that stem from well-known, highly publicized 
diseases (such as cancer) or catastrophic events (such as nuclear accidents), which are 
perceived to be more probable than other, lesser known but more substantial risks. A 
thorough fact-based analysis that assesses a policy’s potential costs and benefits may 
correct certain misperceptions in this regard.   
 Yet, the outcomes of RA can themselves be tainted by biases. Even worse, as a flipside 
of RA’s informational function, there is a danger that the RA process can be consciously 
abused. Those that conduct RA may present and interpret information – or choose to 
supress information – in a manner that supports certain policies that are favoured by the 
government, although the actually or potentially available knowledge base would 
objectively allow for different conclusions that support different policy decisions. There 
may also be a shortage of information, which is especially likely in new areas, where 
                                                 
80 See C. R. Sunstein, ‘Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis’ (2000) 29 Journal of Legal Studies 
1059, arguing that CBA is most plausibly justified on cognitive grounds and providing examples; 
Ahdieh, n 51 above, 2012–2014, noting that this function can also be seen as relating to efficiency. 
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available information may be thin or of poor quality. Indeed, rather than serving as a 
disciplining device, RA may become ‘camouflage’81 or a ‘ritual of verification’ instead of 
advancing substantive goals.82 Thus, the fact that RA has been undertaken does by itself not 
necessarily mean that transparency has been increased. Given these limitations, coupled 
with RA’s often complex technical and quantified elements,  some commentators have 
argued that RA and its disclosures may in fact decrease transparency.83 Nevertheless, this 
latter conclusion is hardly convincing , given that even the disclosure of incorrect data (as 
used in RA) seems inherently more information enhancing compared to the lack of 
disclosure. With disclosure, third parties can at least examine and criticise the use of data.    
 To be sure, there are limits to the level of depth that RA can reasonably be expected to 
engage with the underlying data and available policy options. Yet, if the knowledge base 
that is or should be available can objectively be read to (also) support policies other than 
the ones preferred by the body conducting the analysis and this is not appropriately 
discussed as part of the RA process, the line between legitimate information and 
undesirable ‘promotion’ and misinformation may well be crossed.84   
                                                 
81 See Coates, n 6 above, 898–902. 
82 See Radaelli & de Francesco, n 1 above, 282. This point will also be discussed below, 000–000. 
83 For example, D. M. Driesen, ‘Distributing the Costs of Environmental, Health, and Safety 
Protection: The Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Regulatory Reform’ (2005) 32 
Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review 1, 78–80; Coates, n 6 above, 899. See also 000–
000 on the related issues of quantifiability and complexity, which impact RA’s transparency 
enhancing fuction.  
84 See Posner & Weyl, n 7 above, 249. 
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 Misinformation and promotion, in the negative sense, can be the result of unconscious 
biases, such as where regulators interpret information in light of pre-conceived opinions 
and distorted perceptions or, in the worst case, conscious decisions. It is acknowledged – 
and will be discussed in more detail below – that RA contains ‘a degree of political 
judgment.’85 However, this judgment should as much as possible be limited to the decisions 
that are made based on RA, not the fact-gathering and analytical stages, although it may 
become necessary with respect to the latter. A potential way to mitigate this issue is through 
independent controls throughout various stages of the process and, in addition, by deeper 
and more critical analysis, as will also be further explored elsewhere in this article.  
(B) Regulatory pace 
Finally, an ancillary function of RA can consist of its impact on the pace of governmental 
intervention. RA may serve as a tool to strengthen existing regulation or identify and justify 
new areas suitable for regulation. In part, this relates to RA’s promotional aspects since the 
government can use RA to advance its regulatory goals. Yet, RA is often thought to serve 
more as a brake on regulation than a driver.86 In this vein, cost-benefit analysis has been 
attacked with critics alleging that it unduly burdens regulation and supports a deregulatory 
                                                 
85 Alemanno & Meuwese, n 16 above, 78; 000–000 below.  
86 In the US in particular RA is often perceived as lending itself more to an anti-regulatory stance. 
See, for example, Ahdieh, n 51 above, 1987, 1986 (‘[A] new weapon has emerged in the battle to 
delay, defer, or prevent the adoption of new financial rules: the claim of asserted inadequacies in the 
cost-benefit analysis of relevant regulations.’); Bishop & Coffee, n 21 above, 571; Hahn & 
Sunstein, n 12 above, 1505–1510; Driesen, n 9 above.  
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agenda, sometimes coupled with the argument that RA overestimates costs while 
underestimating benefits.87 Thus, RA can slow down or block the regulatory process due to 
the required fact-finding and analysis, leading to longer and more costly decision-making.88  
Whether RA’s function as a ‘break’ on regulation is undesirable or desirable is a 
matter of perspective and depends on the specific circumstances. In any event, however, the 
actual effect of RA on the regulatory pace is not clear, with one author for instance noting 
that in the US context, there is ‘little evidence that the requirement that agencies conduct 
                                                 
87 See, for example, early critiques by E. M. Kennedy & R. Nader, published as conference 
proceedings in T. B. Clark et al. (eds), Reforming Regulation (Washington et al: American 
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1980) 21–28 and 76–80, respectively. More recent 
contributions voicing similar skepticism include L. Heinzerling, ‘Quality Control: A Reply to 
Professor Sunstein’ (2014) 102 California Law Review 1457; F. Ackerman & L. Heinzerling, 
Priceless: On Knowing the Price of Everything and the Value of Nothing (New York: New Press, 
2004); D. Kysar, Regulating from Nowhere: Environmental Law and the Search for Objectivity 
(Yale University Press: New Haven, 2010); R.L. Revesz & M.A. Livermore, Retaking Rationality: 
How Cost-benefit Analysis Can Better Protect the Environment and Our Health (New York: OUP, 
2008); T. O. McGarity, ‘A Cost-Benefit State’ (1998) 50 Administrative Law Review 7, 50 (1998); 
S. A. Shapiro & R. L. Glicksman, Risk Regulation At Risk: Restoring A Pragmatic Approach 
(Berkeley: Stanford University Press, 2003). See also Radaelli & de Francesco, n 1 above, 288, 
citing empirical studies to this effect. 
88 See Ahdieh, n 45 above, 2016–2017, 1993 (stating that CBA ‘may foster efficient ends or be 
paralyzing’); Alemanno & Meuwese, n 16 above, 80, noting the potential inefficiencies that impact 
analyses may cause in the EU rulemaking context. 
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cost-benefit analyses of significant regulatory efforts has deterred rulemaking’.89 Indeed, 
RA may also have the opposite effect and facilitate regulatory actions,90 as will be shown in 
the following examples referring to the UK and EU. Indeed, as these cases will also reveal, 
corporate law can be partially driven by overestimation of regulatory benefits, which stands 
in stark contrast to concerns voiced for instance in connection with environmental RA. 
Nevertheless, a ‘slow down’ effect of RA is supported insofar as RA requirements can 
make it easier for courts91 and governmental bodies to curtail regulatory initiatives.92 This 
will be seen in the case of the SEC’s proxy access rule discussed below. 
                                                 
89 Stuart Shapiro, ‘Unequal Partners: Cost-Benefit Analysis and Executive Review of Regulations’ 
(2005) 35 Environmental Law Review 10433, 10436. 
90 Radaelli & de Francesco, n 1 above, 281.  
91 A recent example of judicial review – rejecting a new SEC rule – based on RA is the Business 
Roundtable case, which will be discussed in the following part. In the EU, RA has also played a 
role, albeit a smaller one, in the context of judicial proportionality review of regulations and 
directives. See Alemanno & Meuwese, n 16 above, 90; A. Alemanno, ‘A Meeting of Minds on 
Impact Assessment: When Ex Ante Evaluation Meets Ex Post Judicial Control’, (2011) 17 
European Public Law 201. Impact assessments have been considered in this context in decisions 
including case C-58/08, Vodafone Ltd et al v Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform (2010) ECR I-4999 and case C- 176/09, Luxembourg v European Parliament et 
al (2011) ECR I-0000 (both upholding the provisions in question). 
92 As Eric Posner has noted, RA may serve a political function by restraining rulemaking indirectly 
through reporting requirements that facilitate political and judicial checks. E. A. Posner, ‘Cost-
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(A) EXAMPLES 
Having explored RA generally, this part now turns to practical applications in the corporate 
law field. Three examples will be used to illustrate RA in this context: The United States 
Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) proxy access rule; the UK’s most recent 
executive remuneration reforms; and the EU’s new regime governing disclosure of non-
financial corporate information.  
 While the following case studies will be largely descriptive in nature, they will illustrate 
the difficulties in quantifying costs and benefits as well as the tendency for RA to overcome 
potential negative cost-benefit ratios by relying heavily on unquantifiable or non-monetised 
benefits, which tend to be regarded as more substantial than (monetised or non-monetised) 
costs. The case studies will also highlight problems with RA evidence bases, either in the 
form of a dearth in sources and engagement, including selective use of evidence, or, 
alternatively, strong engagement and broad use of sources but inconclusive evidence.  
 (B) Proxy access  
US financial regulatory agencies are generally not legally required to conduct conventional 
RA, although they may do so on a voluntary basis.93 They are, however, normally 
mandated to take into account a variety of factors and the ‘impact’ of regulatory 
                                                                                                                                                    
Benefit Analysis as a Solution to a Principal-Agent Problem’ (2011) 53 Administrative Law Review 
289, 289 n 3, 296.  
93 The executive orders requiring CBA do not cover ‘independent regulatory agencies,’ a category 
that includes most federal financial regulators. Pierce, n 14 above, 573. 
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measures.94 As a prominent example, the SEC is required by statute to ‘also consider, in 
addition to the protection of investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, 
competition, and capital formation.’95 Traditionally, based on this requirement, the SEC 
conducts in-depth CBA of its proposed rules. In  addition, the SEC – like other financial 
regulatory agencies – is subject to the general rule-making requirements of the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which allows reviewing courts to set aside rules that 
are ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 
law.’96 Depending on how this language is interpreted, the APA may serve as a basis to 
invalidate agency actions in case of improper use of or failure to use CBA.97 
 Despite the lack of a firm mandate for financial regulators to undertake formal CBA, 
the issue of RA in financial regulation has been highlighted in recent court decisions. Of 
particular interest for this article is Business Roundtable v. SEC,98 which relates to the 
composition of corporate boards and thus touches upon a core area of corporate 
governance. The underlying issue in this case was a novel SEC rule that would have 
required public companies to provide shareholders with information about, and their ability 
to vote for, shareholder-nominated candidates for the board of directors.  
                                                 
94 See ibid 578–610. 
95 See § 3(f) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f); § 2(b) of the Securities Act of 
1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b); § 2(c) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(c). For 
a detailed discussion, see Ahdieh, n 45 above, 1999–2004. 
96 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59. 
97 Pierce, n 14 above, 575. 
98 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
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 This rule, Rule 14a-11, allowed qualified shareholders to nominate persons for election 
to the board and to ask their company to include these nominees, along with supporting 
statements, in its proxy materials and proxy voting card.99 Thus, shareholders wishing to 
nominate candidates other than those nominated by the incumbent directors would have 
been partially freed from the onerous costs of seeking to affect changes in the board’s 
composition by staging a ‘proxy contest’.100 As such, the rule represented a significant 
change to the existing board governance framework, with the potential to have a substantial 
effect on the balance of power between shareholders and boards. 
 The SEC’s final release accompanying Rule 14a-11 contained its CBA of the new 
provisions.101 Beginning with a consideration of the rule’s expected benefits, the analysis 
discussed among others improvements to shareholders’ ability to exercise their state law 
                                                 
99 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,670 (2010). Additionally, the SEC sought to amend Rule 14a-8 in order 
to allow shareholders to propose proxy nomination procedures for their companies. Although, as 
will be discussed below, these regulatory changes were not implemented, some companies have 
now voluntarily adopted ‘proxy access’. See Financial Times, ‘Proxy access is no cure for US 
governance’ (17 January 2016), available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4b9eb89a-bba2-11e5-b151-
8e15c9a029fb.html.   
100 In a proxy contest, shareholders nominate outsiders and solicit votes for them to be elected to the 
company’s board. This process is costly because dissidents have to prepare and pay for their own 
proxy statements (which contain information for shareholders), with estimated price ranges between 
$30,000 to $9 million per contest. See M. Kahan & E. B. Rock, ‘The Insignificance of Proxy 
Access’ (2011) 97 Virginia Law Review 1347, 1384; Schedule 14A, 17 CFR § 240.14a-101 (2010). 
101 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,753–56,771 (2010). 
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rights to nominate and elect directors; the introduction of minimum uniform procedures for 
inclusion of shareholder director nominations and enhanced ability for shareholders to 
adopt director nomination procedures; more informed voting decisions in director elections 
due to improved disclosure of shareholder director nominations and enhanced shareholder 
communications; and the potential for improved board performance and company 
performance. Nevertheless, in terms of quantifiable benefits, the CBA only included 
savings relating to printing and mailing costs, which were estimated to amount to an 
average of $18,000 per shareholder. However, while acknowledging that certain 
quantifiable benefits may be less than the quantifiable costs of the new rules, the SEC 
pointed to benefits of the new rules that were not easily quantifiable (including greater 
shareholder participation and communication in the director nomination process) and stated 
that it believed ‘that these benefits, collectively, justify the costs of the new rules.’102  
 On the other side of the equation, the SEC considered costs related to potential adverse 
effects on company and board performance; costs related to additional complexity of the 
proxy process; costs related to preparing disclosure, printing and mailing, and additional 
solicitations against the election of shareholders’ director nominees and shareholder 
proposals. Insofar as the CBA quantified these costs (including those connected to related 
amendments to Rule 14a-8 on shareholder proposals), the estimates amounted 
approximately to a combined yearly cost for companies of up to 16,000 hours of personnel 
time and an additional $9.5 million per year for external services and other expenses, with 
an additional cost for solicitation, which one commentator estimated to be up to $14 
                                                 
102 ibid 56,775. 
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million. For shareholders, quantified costs were estimated at approximately 8,000 hours in 
personnel time and $1 million for outside services per year.  In a separate section, the SEC 
also discussed the potential burden on competition and considered the rule’s effects on 
promotion of efficiency, competition, and capital formation. This section confirmed the 
Commission’s view that the benefits justified the costs and that the rule was efficient.103 
  Overall, the CBA considered and engaged in considerable detail with academic 
literature, empirical studies, and numerous comments received from stakeholders and 
commentators.104 On the cost side, a particularly contentious point was the amount that 
company boards would need to spend on solicitation and campaign costs as a result of the 
rule. However, the SEC did not attempt to quantify this cost, noting that Rule 14a-8 did not 
require such actions. On the benefits side, the SEC’s argument that facilitating 
shareholders’ rights in directorial elections may have the potential of improving board 
accountability and efficiency and increasing shareholder value was of particular interest. 
The SEC acknowledged that there was a sharp divide among commenters and that available 
                                                 
103 ibid 56,771–56,776. 
104 Together, the CBA and the ‘Consideration of Burden on Competition and Promotion of 
Efficiency, Competition and Capital Formation’ were discussed over almost 30,000 words 
(including extensive textual footnotes), which is roughly three times more than the sections on costs 
and benefits in the UK’s two executive remuneration impact assessments combined. See also David 
Zaring, ‘The State of Cost-Benefit Analysis at the S.E.C.’ (DealBook, New York Times, 13 July 
2015), available at www.nytimes.com/2015/07/14/business/dealbook/the-state-of-cost-benefit-
analysis-at-the-sec.html, noting that the proxy access rule devoted 17 percent and the conflict 
minerals rule 21 percent of their final versions to economic analysis. 
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empirical data ‘may appear mixed’. 105 It also stated that it had carefully considered the data 
and critical comments that suggested the opposite of what the SEC expected, namely the 
‘potential for negative effects due to management distraction and discord on the board.’106  
 Nevertheless, the SEC, placing considerable weight on a study showing a positive effect 
on shareholder value of so-called ‘hybrid boards’,107 concluded that ‘the totality of the 
evidence and economic theory’ supported the view that facilitating shareholders’ proxy 
access ‘has the potential of creating the benefit of improved board performance and 
enhanced shareholder value,’ either through actual election of shareholder-nominated 
directors or due to companies’ greater reception to shareholders’ concerns. Thus, the SEC 
ultimately found that the potential benefits of improved board and company performance 
and shareholder value justified the new regime’s potential costs.108 
 Shortly after Rule 14a-11 took effect, the Business Roundtable, an organisation that 
promotes US business interests, and the Chamber of Commerce challenged the rule, which 
meant that the D.C. Circuit was entrusted with deciding the further fate of 14a-11.109 The 
court’s opinion was short and damaging. According to the court, the SEC ‘inconsistently 
and opportunistically framed the costs and benefits of the rule; failed adequately to quantify 
the certain costs or to explain why those costs could not be quantified; neglected to support 
its predictive judgments; contradicted itself; and failed to respond to substantial problems 
                                                 
105 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,761 (2010). 
106 ibid. 
107 Referring to boards composed of a majority of incumbent and a minority of dissident directors. 
108 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,761 (2010). 
109 Responding to a request for an injunction, the court initially stayed the rule pending its review. 
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raised by commenters.’110 In commenting specifically on the SEC’s treatment of the 
indirect, and more difficult to assess, systemic effects of facilitated proxy access and 
potentially increased number of dissident board members, the court opined that the SEC 
relied upon insufficient empirical data in measuring the rule’s benefits, namely improved 
board performance and increased shareholder value.111 In finding that reliance on merely 
‘mixed’ empirical evidence was insufficient to support the new rule,112 the court imposed a 
                                                 
110 Business Roundtable, n 98 above, at 1148–1149. See, however, ICI v. CFTC, 720 F.3d 370 (D.C. 
Cir. 2013), where the same court granted greater deference to regulatory CBA in the context of a 
rule promulgated by the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission. 
111 But see the critique in G. M. Hayden & M. T. Bodie, ‘The Bizarre Law and Economics of 
Business Roundtable v. SEC’ (2012) 38 Journal of Corporation Law 101, 102, arguing that the 
court’s own reasoning ‘rests on flawed empirical and theoretical conclusions about proxy access 
and corporate governance’. See also J. E. Fish, ‘The Long Road Back: Business Roundtable and the 
Future of SEC Rulemaking’ (2013) 36 Seattle University Law Review 695, 701 (opining that the 
court substituted its own policy judgment for that of the SEC); Ahdieh, n 45 above, 2064 (criticising 
the court’s lack of deference). Conversely, E. A. Posner & G. W. Weyl, ‘Benefit-Cost Paradigms in 
Financial Regulation’ (2014) Journal of Legal Studies S1, S9, conclude that ‘the SEC did not 
monetize the expected benefits and costs of the rule, and therefore had no basis for claiming that the 
rule complied with a benefit-cost analysis, and hence served the public interest.’  
112 Business Roundtable, n 98 above, at 1150–1151. For more details on the empirical evidence 
considered by the SEC and its role in the decision, see B. Kraus & C. Raso, ‘Rational Boundaries 
for SEC Cost-Benefit Analysis’ (2013) 30 Yale Journal on Regulation 289, 312–314 (noting, 
among others, that the court mistook a report that had been paid for by the Business Roundtable as 
an independent empirical study) and Hayden & Bodie, n 111 above, 120–125. 
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high evidentiary burden on the SEC with respect to its CBA, which – along with the court’s 
overall decision – was subsequently criticised in academic commentary.113 Finally, using 
the APA’s ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard, the D.C. Circuit vacated Rule 14a-11, 
concluding that the SEC neglected its statutory obligations to properly quantify and assess 
economic consequences of the rule.114   
(B) Executive remuneration 
RA also played an important role in the UK government’s latest reform of executive 
remuneration. In main part, these reforms consisted of the introduction of mandatory say on 
pay and heightened disclosure requirements.115 The background to the new regime was the 
long-standing political discontent with executive pay, public and media pressures, and the 
                                                 
113 A standard close to requiring ‘clear and convincing’ evidence, as some authors have suggested. 
Kraus & Raso, n 112 above, 361; Hayden & Bodie, n 111 above, 108 n 55 (citing various 
academics that have expressed concern over the Business Roundtable decision). See also n 161 and 
accompanying text below, suggesting that the SEC’s regulatory analysis should have passed judicial 
scrutiny under the applicable standard.   
114 Subsequently, the SEC has issued a guidance memorandum, addressing many of the criticisms 
put forth in the Business Roundtable decision. SEC, ‘Memorandum – Current Guidance on 
Economic Analysis in SEC Rulemaking’ (2012), available at 
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/riskfin/rsfi_guidance_econ_analy_secrulemaking.pdf.  
115 The new framework, which applies to UK incorporated quoted companies, became effective on 
October 1, 2013. For an overview, see M. Petrin, ‘Executive Compensation in the United Kingdom 
- Past, Present, and Future’ (2015) 36 The Company Lawyer 195.  
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recent financial crisis, which once again put a spotlight on executive pay and its relation to 
risk-taking and performance. Broadly speaking, the government’s position in the process 
leading up to the reform measures was that there was a ‘disconnect between pay and 
performance’ and unstainable ‘ratcheting-up of executive pay.’116  
 With the new regime, the government’s stated aim was improving the link between pay 
and performance; reducing rewards for failure; promoting engagement between companies 
and shareholders; and empowering shareholders to hold companies accountable.117 To this 
end, a two-tiered approach was introduced118 and adopted in late 2013.119 First, at least 
                                                 
116 BIS, ‘Directors’ Pay: Consultation on revised remuneration reporting regulations’ (June 2012) 5. 
For further background, see ibid 9–14; Petrin, n 115 above. 
117 BIS, n 116 above, 5. 
118 See, generally, The Large and Medium-sized Companies and Groups (Accounts and Reports) 
Amendment Regulations 2013 (‘2013 Regulations’), revoking and replacing Schedule 8 of the 
Companies and Groups (Accounts and Reports) Regulations 2008; Enterprise and Regulatory 
Reform Act 2013, amending the Companies Act 2006.  
119 The EU has proposed executive remuneration rules (in addition to separately proposed rules 
applicable to financial institutions) that are similar to the UK model. An impact assessment has 
already concluded that the positive impacts would clearly outweigh costs and burdens. See 
European Commission, ‘Impact Assessment, accompanying the document Proposal for a Directive 
of the European Parliament and of the Council on amending Directive 2007/36/EC as regards the 
encouragement of long-term shareholder engagement and Directive 2013/34/EU as regards certain 
elements of the corporate governance statement and Commission Recommendation on the quality 
of corporate governance reporting (‘comply or explain’)’ (9 April 2014), SWD(2014) 127 final. 
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once every three years, companies are required to hold a binding shareholder vote on their 
general policy for annual directorial remuneration. Second, shareholders get an annual non-
binding advisory vote regarding the ongoing implementation of remuneration policies. 
Additionally, executive remuneration is subject to greater disclosure requirements and there 
are new civil consequences for individuals who authorise and receive unapproved 
payments.  
 The Department for Business, Innovation & Skills conducted two impact assessments 
to accompany the new provisions, one on shareholder voting and one on the transparency 
portions of the new provisions. In the assessment of shareholder voting on executive 
remuneration, the government presented executive pay as a problem of market failure and 
agency costs.120 It also restated its aims and emphasised shareholder empowerment as the 
key to address executive remuneration issues:  
The policy objective is to address failures in the governance of directors’ pay by 
equipping shareholders with the enhanced tools they need to challenge companies. 
Shareholder empowerment lies at the heart of the UK’s corporate governance 
framework and these reforms are consistent with that approach. They will enable 
shareholders to promote a stronger, clearer link between pay and performance and to 
challenge companies on rewards for mediocrity or failure, while still allowing for 
exceptional performance to be rewarded.121 
 This impact assessment did not attempt to monetise costs, benefits, or net benefits, 
citing difficulties in predicting behavioural changes in shareholders and companies as well 
                                                 
120 BIS, ‘Shareholder votes on directors’ remuneration – Impact Assessment’ (9 May 2012) 1, 4. 
121 ibid 1. 
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as uncertainties regarding the development of the wider economy and regulatory 
environment.122 Referring to key non-monetised costs, the impact assessment stated that 
there may be ‘some’ costs in relation to increased shareholder engagement and time spent 
on updating pay policies.123 It also noted potential costs related to holding an additional 
general meeting to vote on revised pay proposals, ‘but consultation responses indicate that 
companies will take action to avoid such an outcome’.124  
 In terms of key benefits, the impact assessment found potentially ‘significant’ benefits 
to business and shareholders as a result of better alignment between pay schemes and 
performance, which, however, it said were difficult to monetise.125 Key non-monetised 
benefits were identified as reduced engagement costs due to improved shareholder-
company collaboration, increased long-term performance through better pay design, more 
efficient resource allocation by increased dividend payouts or reinvestment, and improved 
corporate governance with lower cost of capital. 126 After weighing unmonetised benefits 
against unmonetised costs, the impact assessment concluded that the preferred option was 
likely to result in benefits ‘significantly larger than any potential increase in costs that 
companies might face or loss of earnings faced by individual directors’.127 
                                                 
122 ibid 2, 20. 
123 ibid 2 (summarising the assessment’s results). 
124 ibid. 
125 ibid.  
126 ibid. 
127 ibid 20–30, providing a narrative analysis of the policy options under considerations. 
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 The separate impact assessment on the effects of increased transparency of executive 
remuneration reporting estimated that the proposed reforms would have a negative net 
benefit over 10 years of £51.2 million and yearly net costs to businesses of £5.2 million.128 
Costs in this regard, characterised as ‘transitional one-time costs’, consisted of internal 
compliance and external professional fees, while the benefits were reduced monitoring 
costs by shareholders and non-executive directors. Yet, the impact assessment’s 
recommendation in support of increased disclosure rested heavily on ‘key non-monetised 
benefits’. These were described to include the potential for more efficient allocation of 
resources and improved managerial incentives, more informed and efficient shareholder-
company engagement,  and – ultimately – ‘a more engaged and empowered shareholder 
base’ that ‘could lead to better corporate governance in UK companies which is associated 
with lower costs of capital’.129 
 Based on these benefits, the impact assessment on transparency of executive 
remuneration reporting concluded that the transitional costs for companies ‘are likely to be 
significantly outweighed by the potential improvements in company performance that can 
result from better aligned executive remuneration due to better information’. This 
conclusion was further underlined by a break-even type argument, with the assessment 
noting that ‘for the FTSE100 alone, the market capitalisation would need to increase 
annually by only 0.0003 per cent, or operating profit by only 0.003 per cent to exceed the 
                                                 
128 BIS, ‘Improved Transparency of Executive Remuneration – Impact Assessment’ (29 May 2013) 
1, 3 (summarising the assessment’s results). 
129 ibid 3. 
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costs.’130 Overall, while the quantified costs and benefits resulted in negative benefits, the 
non-monetised benefits were thought to be so large as to lead to a positive overall outcome.  
(B) Non-financial disclosure 
Another example of the application of RA in the corporate realm is provided in the area of 
non-financial disclosures, which touches upon corporate social responsibility (CSR) and – 
from a broader corporate law perspective – the discussion surrounding the corporate 
purpose and companies’ role in our society. While other jurisdictions have introduced 
comparable measures,131 this section focuses on the EU’s recently adopted requirements 
regarding corporate disclosure of non-financial and diversity information.  
 As per a 2014 directive, companies and groups exceeding an average of 500 employees 
during a financial year, as well as parent companies of qualifying entities, shall disclose 
information on three areas related to corporate social responsibility: Policies, risks and 
outcomes pertaining to environmental matters; social and employee-related aspects; and 
respect for human rights, anti-corruption and bribery issues.132 The disclosed information 
                                                 
130 ibid 5. 
131 Examples of social disclosure can be found in the UK, among other jurisdictions. Furthermore, 
in the US, a noteworthy recent SEC rule imposed a requirement on corporations to disclose 
information on conflict minerals. See section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act, amending the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 by inserting Section 13(p). 
132 Directive 2014/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 
amending Directive 2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by 
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should  include a description of the company’s business model; a description of the contents 
and outcome of the policies the company pursues in relation to the subject matter of the 
disclosures, including implemented due diligence processes; the principal risks related to 
those matters; and non-financial key performance indicators that are relevant to the 
particular business, insofar as they relate to these specific areas.133 Companies can disclose 
either through a non-financial statement in the annual report or – on a voluntary basis – a 
separate, more detailed report. Where such a stand-alone report is submitted, the company 
is exempt from the requirement to also include a statement in its annual report.   
 In terms of the Directive’s non-financial disclosure requirements other than pertaining 
to diversity, which will be used as an example herein, the overall goal is to increase the 
quality and quantity of CSR-related information, in line with the EU’s previously stated 
goal of strengthening corporate social responsibility.134 The impact assessment of the new 
provisions135 reiterated this focus on CSR. Its analysis and support of regulatory 
                                                                                                                                                    
certain large undertakings and groups. In addition, companies are required to disclose information 
on policies in relation to diversity, broadly defined, pertaining to their administrative, management, 
and supervisory bodies (hereinafter the ‘Directive’). This article, however, focuses on the CSR 
portion of the Directive. 
133 ibid articles 1 and 3, amending Directive 2013/34/EU by inserting articles 19a and 29a. 
134 As recently reiterated in EU Commission, ‘The EU’s 2011-2014 Strategy for Corporate Social 
Responsibility’ (25 October 2011) COM(2011) 681 final. 
135 EU Commission, ‘Impact Assessment Accompanying the document Proposal for a Directive of 
the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 
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intervention requiring disclosure of non-financial information was based on three main 
considerations: societal and investors’ demand for transparency and accountability; the 
connection between non-financial and financial performance; and capital market efficiency. 
The problem, according to the assessment, is inadequate transparency of non-financial 
information, both in terms of quality and quantity, acerbated by lack of regulation and a 
market failure caused by a lack of incentives and uncertain benefits attached to such 
disclosure.136  To mitigate these ills, the impact assessment identified as the preferred 
policy option the mix of mandatory and voluntary disclosure measures discussed above and 
later adopted by the Directive.137  
 The assessment identified annual compliance cost, stemming from drafting reports, 
publication, or staff training, in the range of €600–4300 per year per company, resulting in 
an overall cost of €10.5 to 75.25 million. For companies that choose to comply with the 
voluntary portion of the new disclosure regime, the cost of producing a separate report was 
estimated to be in the range of €33,000 to €604,000.138 However, although it seems likely 
that some companies will face pressures to produce more detailed voluntary reports – and, 
                                                                                                                                                    
83/349/EEC as regards disclosure of nonfinancial and diversity information by certain large 
companies and groups’ (16 April 2013) SWD(2013) 127 final. 
136 ibid 10–12.  
137 ibid 24–30. 
138 ibid 40. 
REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN CORPORATE LAW                                                                           47 
 
 
indeed, that these reports could have a greater impact – the assessment did not include 
expenses incurred in compiling these reports in the preferred policy option’s analysis.139  
 As to the new disclosure regime’s benefits, the assessment pointed to numerous 
improvements that were thought to be significant. These included increased transparency, 
which was expected to result in better performance of companies140 and better risk 
assessment as evidenced by ‘a growing body of academic research [that] indicates a 
positive correlation between better non-financial and financial performance’;141 increased 
accountability, reputation, and consumer trust, leading also to potentially increased 
demand; enhanced efficiency of capital markets through lower cost of capital due to better 
CSR and environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors; positive environmental 
impacts; a reduction in instances of companies’ involvement in human rights abuses; 
positive effects on various fundamental rights; and a decrease in corporate short-termism.142  
 Nevertheless, the assessment also noted that the benefits flowing from non-financial 
disclosure were in most cases difficult to quantify, depended on the behaviour of specific 
companies and their managers and investors, and precise estimates as to what extent the 
preferred option would contribute to their achievement could not be provided.143 Indeed, in 
                                                 
139 ibid 69. 
140 The assessment draws a connection between the lack of disclosure and firms’ financial 
performance, suggesting that increased disclosure will have a positive effect by causing companies 
to better integrate non-financial risks and opportunities into their operations and strategies. ibid 12. 
141 ibid 18 (emphasis omitted). 
142 ibid 18, 37–42.   
143 ibid 28, 37, 39. 
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an external study commissioned to support the impact assessment process, a sample of EU 
companies were asked whether they had sought to quantify the benefits from non-financial 
reporting. Out of the twenty companies that responded to this question, only three 
companies had tried to do so, and of these only one had arrived at a financial estimate. This 
company, which had a non-financial reporting cost in the range of €300,000, apparently 
identified efficiency savings of €80 million. Nevertheless, the details behind this impressive 
figure were not revealed and, as the external study noted, the company in question ‘was 
unclear of the extent to which other factors than non-financial reporting were relevant.’144 
 Thus, the impact assessment did not include any quantified estimates as to the benefits 
envisaged by mandatory non-financial disclosure. It also did not directly address the 
question of whether the benefits outweigh the costs, apart from one passage where the 
assessment pointed to consultations with users of non-financial information – in particular 
investors and NGOs – who ‘suggested that the costs of reporting would be outweighed by 
the benefits to civil society, investors, in terms of increased transparency and possibility to 
take better account of companies’ performance in the long term’.145 Still, as evidenced by 
the impact assessment’s discussion of costs and benefits and its recommendation to adopt 
the preferred policy option that was later implemented by the Directive, it is clear that the 
unquantified benefits were thought to be highly significant, and larger than the costs.146   
                                                 
144 The Centre for Strategy and Evaluation Services (CSES), ‘Disclosure of non-financial 
information by Companies’ (December 2011) 31.   
145 EU Commission, above n 135, 45. 
146 See ibid, in particular 37–42. 
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(A) RECONCEPTUALISING REGULATORY ANALYSIS     
Drawing from the previous examples, and against the background of the functions that RA 
is theoretically thought to serve, the following sections further analyse the application of 
RA to corporate law, focusing on key difficulties. This part will conclude with outlining a 
revised view, suggesting that RA in corporate law should be mainly a procedural tool that 
enhances information, transparency, and monitoring, without recourse to specific normative 
criteria (such as efficiency). From a normative perspective, the revised view suggests that 
RA needs to rely on both quantified analysis and regulatory judgment, and that the focus 
for future improvements should be on improvements in consultation processes, critical 
analysis and engagement, ex post reviews, and transparency.  
(B) Complexity and quantifiability 
The most serious challenges faced by RA are likely those that relate to predicting and 
monetising future events or ‘impacts’ caused by new (or changing) policies. RA may give a 
false sense of certainty and precision when it assesses costs and benefits – or positive and 
negative impacts – that are difficult or even impossible to foresee, and even more difficult 
to quantify. In particular, issues may arise because regulatory changes can have complex 
consequences, due to a lack of reliable data, and based on problems related to assigning 
monetary values to impacts under these circumstances. In other words, difficulties in 
predicting how future systems will work under proposed new rules make it difficult to 
assess and quantify their impacts. Indeed, as John Coates has recently suggested, RA may 
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often become an exercise in ‘guesstimation’.147 These weaknesses also negatively affect 
RA’s informational functions given that analyses that are based on inaccurate numbers and 
assumptions might be read as objective facts by the public. The result are potentially 
misleading RA with severly reduced informational and transparency-enhancing benefits. 
 To be sure, these issues are known and it has been acknowledged that RA contains 
speculative elements and is susceptible to manipulation.148 Indeed, the UK’s National Audit 
Office has pointed to weaknesses in reliability, including a lack of consideration of 
unintended consequences and failure to properly monetise costs and benefits, as a main 
concern for UK impact assessments, while an OECD review has cited studies criticising the 
UK’s consideration of only a narrow range of impacts.149 It is not uncommon for regulators 
themselves to state expressly the limitations they face in conducting RA, which is also 
reflected in the case studies discussed above. Speaking more generally, the US Office of 
Management and Budget has also emphasised the difficulties in quantifying or monetising 
costs and benefits, warning that ‘[i]n some cases, quantification of various effects is highly 
speculative’ and that ‘significantly, prospective estimates may contain erroneous 
assumptions, producing inaccurate predictions.’150 
                                                 
147 Coates, n 6 above, 882, 998. 
148 See, for example, Ahdieh, n 45 above, 2011 (commenting on CBA). 
149 National Audit Office, Assessing the Impact of Proposed New Policies (London: The Stationary 
Office, 2010) 23; OECD, n 77 above, 25. 
150 Office of Management and Budget, n 56 above, 4. 
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 Yet, even with regulators acknowledging limitations, once a regulatory analysis has 
been completed, its outcome-determinative force is considerable. What counts in the end is 
that a final conclusion backs a certain policy, while any mention of limitations or 
uncertainties may be easily overlooked or become less important in the legislative or 
regulatory process. However, if the assumptions and numerical projections underlying the 
conclusion are not reliable, RA becomes problematic. Even for the UK and EU, where 
strict CBA and quantified numbers tend to be less important, strong reliance on non-
monetised impacts whose basis is not made sufficiently clear is difficult to reconcile with 
goals such as ‘providing information and transparency on the benefits and costs of different 
policy alternatives’151 and, indeed, producing ‘better’ laws and regulations.  
 In connection with financial regulation, the usefulness of RA has recently been the 
subject of intense academic debate, with questions of uncertainty and quantifiability lying 
at the centre of the controversy.152 For instance, Jeffrey Gordon has argued that applying 
                                                 
151 IA Guidelines 2009, n 28 above, section 1.2. 
152 Scholars questioning or denying the usefulness of CBA in financial regulation include Ahdieh, 
n 45 above; Fish, n 111 above, 713; Gordon, n 22 above; Ben-Shahar & Schneider, n 11 above. 
Supporters of CBA include Posner & Weyl, n 111 above; Rose & Walker, n 18 above; E. Sherwin, 
‘The Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Lessons from the SEC’s Stalled Mutual Fund 
Reform Effort’ (2006) 12 Stanford Journal of Law, Business & Finance 1; C.R. Sunstein, ‘Financial 
Regulation and Cost-Benefit Analysis’ (2015) 124 Yale Law Journal Forum 263, available at 
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/SunsteinPDF_4nf1d4ar.pdf. An intermediate position is taken 
by Coates, n 6 above. 
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CBA to complex issues of financial regulation is useless or even counterproductive.153 
Gordon’s main point is that CBA is incompatible with ‘non-natural,’ man-made systems 
such as the financial sector since the costs and benefits such systems produce depend on 
regulatory changes. He argues that financial regulation as ‘a system constructed by the 
pattern of financial regulation itself and by the subsequent processes of adaptation and 
regulatory arbitrage’ is not an area suitable for meaningful applications of CBA in 
determining its optimal setting.154 This unstable system, Gordon concludes, is not based on 
weighing of costs and benefits but rather a ‘series of trade-offs of values that are 
normatively derived’.155 On this basis, he also rejects the outcome in Business 
Roundtable,156 arguing that the proxy access rule defies ready economic quantification 
because of its potential to modify the prevailing corporate governance paradigm.157 
 In corporate law, there are similar concerns. Regulating corporate governance is not 
comparable to imposing regulations such as those that relate to requirements to wear 
seatbelts, or dosages of drugs, or permitted emission levels of certain substances.  Instead, 
                                                 
153 Gordon, n 22 above. 
154 ibid, 351, 352–355. Compare, however, R. L. Revesz & M. A. Livermore, Retaking Rationality: 
How Cost-Benefit Analysis Can Better Protect the Environment and our Health (New York: OUP, 
2008) 14, arguing that CBA can be particularly useful in addressing uncertainty. 
155 Gordon, n 22 above, 353. Gordon contrasts this with regulatory frameworks in the health, safety, 
or environmental area that are based on exogenous anchoring principles of chemistry, biology, or 
physics, where he argues the use of CBA tends to be more appropriate. 
156 Above n 98. 
157 Gordon, n 22 above, 370–371.  
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corporate law is another example of a ‘man made’ system that is not subject to the laws of 
chemistry, biology, and physics158 and generally not conducive to technical, science-based 
assessments.159 Rather, legislators and regulators design and implement the rules, and when 
they are changed, it becomes hard to foresee the consequences.160   
 To begin, extrapolating from these examples, regulators may believe that costs of 
reform measures are moderate (and can be estimated) while, at the same time, assuming 
that there are substantial benefits, which however cannot be quantified or, where they have 
been quantified, are subject to considerable limitations. In all three case studies – proxy 
access, executive remuneration, and non-financial disclosure – key benefits were not 
monetised, although it was these benefits that the analyses relied on most heavily to show 
that the balance of costs/benefits or impacts supported the proposed measures. As will be 
noted below, a lack of quantification is not by itself objectionable as long as it is justified 
and accompanied by a thorough qualitative analysis and explanation. In this respect, the 
court in Business Roundtable v. SEC went too far in faulting the SEC for what appeared to 
be a thorough and balanced CBA.161 The agency considered and engaged in detail with 
                                                 
158 ibid, 359. 
159 This is, for example, in contrast to environmental assessments. See M. Lee, EU Environmental 
Law, Governance and Decision-Making (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2nd ed, 2014) 164–174.    
160 For this reason, controls and post-implementation review as a quasi-substitute for foresight 
become crucial. On this see below, text to notes 201–203. 
161 An event study based on the Business Roundtable’s challenge even found that firms that were 
potentially the most affected by the proposed proxy access would have increased their market value 
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comments, studies, and academic literature and provided detailed cost-benefit projections. 
Ultimately, however, the SEC reached the limits of what was quantifiable, and the court 
seems to have faulted the SEC for exercising regulatory judgement, which however 
appeared necessary given the inconclusive evidence.   
 Conversely, there are reasons to question the UK and EU impact assessments’ 
completeness and reliability.  For instance, the UK government’s assessment of executive 
remuneration reform costs and benefits may well have been overly optimistic, offered a 
mostly one-sided analysis and, moreover, was built on a comparatively thin factual basis. 
To be more specific, in terms of costs, even if it turns out that after a phase of transitory 
costs there will be no additional and longer-term direct monetary expenses, companies will 
have less flexibility to design remuneration packages that are effective in appointing the 
most sought after executives, which was not properly taken into account. This effect is 
perhaps part of the desired ‘dampening’ of pay levels, but it remains a threat that should 
have been explicitly acknowledged. On the benefits side, the positive impacts of the 
reforms are not as clear as the RA suggests. For instance, greater transparency will likely 
only be felt by institutional investors, as it was at one point already conceded by the 
government.162 It is also doubtful whether the relatively minor changes in disclosed data 
and structure of reported remuneration information will ultimately have any significant 
positive consequences. Moreover, the assessments failed to engage with criticisms 
                                                                                                                                                    
under the new regime. See Bo Becker et al., ‘Does Shareholder Proxy Access Improve Firm Value? 
Evidence from the Business Roundtable Challenge’ (2013) 56 Journal of Law and Economics 127. 
162 See BIS, n 128 above, 19. 
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suggesting potentially negative impacts of increased disclosure on pay levels as well as 
with research that cautions against placing greater emphasis on shareholders’ say on pay.163 
Indeed, both measures – disclosure and say on pay – have been plausibly linked with 
negative effects. Say on pay, in its previous shape as an advisory vote for shareholders, has 
not reversed the trend to increasing executive pay packages and may even have lead to 
efficiency losses.164 Based on early indicators, the new mandatory vote on executive pay 
regime is also unlikely to change this trend.165 An even bigger source of concern are claims 
                                                 
163 On disclosure, see Ben-Shahar & Schneider, n 11 above; A. Dignam, ‘Remuneration and Riots: 
Rethinking Corporate-Governance Reform in the Age of Entitlement’ (2013) 66 Current Legal 
Problems 401; B. E. Hermalin & M. S. Weisbach, ‘Information Disclosure and Corporate 
Governance’ (2012) 67 Journal of Finance 195. On say on pay, R. Correa & U. Lel, ‘Say on Pay 
Laws, Executive Compensation, CEO Play Slice, and Firm Value around the World’ (2013/14) 
International Finance Discussion Article, 
 http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2013/1084/ifdp1084.pdf (finding that only advisory say 
on pay votes, but not mandatory ones, tightened executive pay performance sensitivity); G. 
Ferrarini et al, ‘Executive Remuneration in Crisis: A Critical Assessment of Reforms in Europe’ 
(2010) 10 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 73, 86–88, 111; J. N. Gordon, ‘“Say on Pay”: 
Cautionary Notes on the U.K. Experience and the Case for Shareholder Opt-in’ (2009) Harvard 
Journal on Legislation 323. For a critical discussion of both aspects, see D. Kershaw, Company 
Law in Context (Oxford: OUP, 2012) 303–04. 
164 Gordon, n 163 above, 344–45. 
165 See Petrin, n 115 above, 202. 
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that pay disclosure leads to higher pay levels.166 Thus, in light of existing grave concerns 
against the two key features of the UK’s strategy to regulate executive remuneration, a 
thorough RA should have included an in-depth discussion of these potential obstacles – 
which was not the case.    
 Similarly, the impact assessment of the EU’s non-financial disclosure rules raises 
several questions. First, given the lack of details on how benefits were assessed, how 
realistic is it that the mandatory part of the new regime, with its small projected costs, will 
result in benefits that are as large and broad in scope as the assessment assumed? The more 
extensive voluntary disclosures are more promising in this sense, although they are also far 
more costly. In any event, as already outlined above, the expected benefits were not 
quantified and there was no trustworthy data to make these projections. Second, there is the 
question of how reliable the regulator’s assumption is that non-financial performance or 
CSR improve financial performance. Apart from a cursory reference to ‘academic 
research’, the assessment did not include details on the evidence it relied on in this regard. 
 Overall, therefore, the challenge for regulators and, if they are reviewing RA, courts lies 
in balancing expectations in terms of projecting and quantifying the consequences of 
regulatory initiatives against the practical difficulties in doing so. While acknowledging 
inherent limitations is important, regulators should also avoid falling into the trap of 
overestimating benefits and underestimating costs and failing to discuss countervailing 
evidence. From a more technical standpoint, other options to mitigate problems related to 
                                                 
166 See, for example, Dignam, n 163 above, who makes a convincing argument that transparency 
initatives in particular have fuelled rather than dampened ‘elite pay’. 
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quantification include further refinement of the methods used in RA. It has been suggested 
that in complex, difficult to quantify areas tools such as multi-criteria analysis or break-
even (threshold) analysis are superior compared to traditional CBA.167 However, even these 
tools contain speculative elements and would continue to require regulators to assign values 
to uncertain impacts, which might be problematic, unfeasible, and even misleading.  
 Thus, in certain cases it can be more prudent for regulators to follow an approach 
similar to the SEC’s approach in its analysis of the US Conflict Minerals Rule. There, the 
SEC stated in part that it was unable to readily quantify the rule’s social benefits, remarking 
that they were ‘quite different from the economic or investor protection benefits that our 
rules ordinarily strive to achieve.’168  In a decision by the D.C. Circuit on this same rule, the 
court confirmed this sentiment, finding that ‘an agency is not required “to measure the 
immeasurable”’.169 Still, regulators should not be quick to assume that something is, in fact, 
immeasurable and make good faith efforts at quantification.  
                                                 
167 See, for example, Renda et al., n 17 above, 203; C. R. Sunstein, ‘The Limits of Quantification’ 
(2014) 102 California Law Review 1369. In the US, Circular A-4 (n 15 above) explicitly states that 
where non-quantified factors are likely to be important, regulator should use break-even analysis. 
168 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274, 56,342, 56,335 (2012). In line with section 13(p) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, the SEC rules require certain issuers to disclose annually information on 
their use of minerals originated in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or an adjoining country. 
169 National Association of Manufacturers v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359, 369 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Of course, a 
lesser degree of quantification may result in assessments that are akin to ‘promotional’ tools to 
persuade the public. This can be countered by placing more weight on thorough and discursive RA 
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(B) Contentious issues 
The discussion of difficulties stemming from complexity and quantifiability leads over to 
another problem. Not being able to (precisely) predict and quantify future costs, benefits, or 
impacts does not render RA useless. However, in situations where these issues are 
prevalent, another issue comes to the forefront – in the absence of reliable, non-conflicting 
evidence or data, what should guide RA and justify choices of preferred regulatory options?  
 In this vein, a major difficulty with RA in corporate law is its use as a basis for 
regulators to decided highly contentious issues of corporate governance that are not 
amenable to regulatory analytical tools. For example, from the case studies discussed 
above, we can see that the SEC – although explicitly acknowledging conflicting empirical 
evidence and sharply divided comments – posited that proxy access and, as an extension, 
shareholder representation on boards, contributes to positive firm performance. The UK 
government concluded that there is a market and regulatory failure in executive pay and 
that there is a need to intervene and strengthen the role of shareholders in the remuneration-
setting process. Finally, as evidenced by non-financial disclosure rules in the EU, regulators 
have further ventured into the shareholder-stakeholder debate, finding that CSR benefits 
businesses financially and suggesting at least indirectly that corporate duties extend in part 
to third parties other than shareholders.  
 The point of this article is not to comment on the substance of these issues, but rather to 
highlight the role of RA. In this respect, those conducting RA should proceed with care 
                                                                                                                                                    
that explores the knowledge base from multiple angles and is subject to external reviews. On this, 
see text to notes 000–000 and 000–000. 
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when faced with fundamental issues that are not supported by clear data and subject to 
unresolved discussions in academic or other expert circles. Indeed, as two commentators 
have noted regarding the specific sub-problem of contradicting evidence in RA, ‘when 
academics using proper research methods have come to conflicting conclusions about 
empirical results, it is quixotic for agencies and courts to endeavor to find one true 
answer.’170 Yet, this does not mean that no action can be taken or that conclusive evidence 
of an intervention’s impact has to be presented. As Sunstein remarked, ‘[with] cost-benefit 
analysis, it is at least possible to know what people are disagreeing about’.171 This is true 
for RA more generally. To preserve RA’s usefulness, however, regulators need to engage 
with views that diverge from their own position and be transparent about uncertainties, 
limitations, and any regulatory values or judgments that informed the analysis.  
 Comparing the SEC’s proxy access CBA and the UK and EU’s impact assessments 
relating to executive remuneration and non-financial disclosure, respectively reveals that 
the SEC’s analysis is more thorough and extensive172 and includes more in-depth 
engagement with diverging views. In contrast, the UK and EU’s impact assessments 
discussed in this article tend to frame the problem mostly from one point of view, with little 
to no space dedicated to opposing arguments and evidence. In the assessment of UK 
executive remuneration rules, for instance, it would have been useful to discuss shareholder 
empowerment as the underlying fundamental corporate governance question. The 
                                                 
170 Hayden & Bodie, n 11 above, 125. 
171 Sunstein, n 152 above, 267. 
172 See, for example, n 104 above and accompanying text. 
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assessment does not grapple with research that questions shareholders’ ability to be 
engaged and long-term oriented corporate stakeholders,173 suggestions that shareholders 
themselves may be part of the executive remuneration problem,174 or potential new issues 
related to the shifting of powers to proxy vote advisors.175 The impact assessment 
pertaining to EU non-financial disclosure rules, for its part, lacks a discussion of research 
contradicting the assessment’s position that non-financial disclosure and CSR lead to better 
financial performance.176  
 Indeed, concerning the UK, studies have already identified various weaknesses, 
including narrow consultation processes, evidence that assessments were conducted outside 
                                                 
173 See, for example, B. R. Cheffins, ‘The Stewardship Code’s Achilles’ Heel’ (2010) 73 Modern 
Law Review 1004; J. Kay, ‘Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-Term Decision-Making’ 
(July 2012). 
174 C. Villiers, ‘Controlling Executive Pay: Institutional Investors or Distributive Justice?’ (2010) 10 
Journal of Corporate Law Studies 309, 341. 
175 See S. M. Bainbridge, Corporate Governance after the Financial Crisis (New York: OUP, 2012) 
133–134; D.F. Larcker et al., ‘Outsourcing Shareholder Voting to Proxy Advisory Firms’ (last 
updated 2014) Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No 
119, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2101453 (suggesting decreases 
in shareholder value). 
176 A recent example is H. Servaes & A. Tamayo, ‘The Impact of Corporate Social Responsibility 
on Firm Value: The Role of Customer Awareness’ (2013) 59 Management Science 1045, which 
find a neutral or negative relation between CSR and firm value for businesses with low customer 
awareness. 
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of or after the policy development process, and insufficient provision or even omission of 
significant evidence.177 In particular, UK impact assessments accompanying the 
implementation of EU policies are often produced after a decision has been made at the EU 
level, thereby severely limiting the potential scope and utility of domestic impact 
assessments.178 These weaknesses are worrying and raise reliability concerns.179  
 The relative lack of critical engagement in the UK and EU is to some extent logical 
given that in these jurisdictions RA is embedded in the political decision-making process. 
Policies such as mandatory say-on-pay provisions or non-financial disclosure need to be 
understood against the background of broader political goals. For example, non-financial 
disclosure is based on the EU’s corporate governance plan and is in line with the EU’s 
support for a stakeholder approach, which emphasises the need for – and benefits 
associated with – corporations to act in a socially responsible manner. The UK’s (and the 
EU’s) executive remuneration policies are part of the evolving shareholder democracy 
                                                 
177 See National Audit Office, n 149 above; OECD, n 77 above. See also D. Russel & J. Turnpenny, 
‘The politics of sustainable development in UK government: what role for integrated policy 
appraisal?’ (2009) 27 Environment and Planning C 340, 341 (echoing concerns that impact 
assessments ‘were ex post justifications of predetermined decisions rather than ex ante appraisals to 
drive policy development’).  
178 National Audit Office, n 149 above, 8.  
179 Yet, it is worth noting that these types of serious issues are, by design, not taken into account in 
emerging ‘scorecard’ type methods of evaluating the quality of RA. For an example of this 
approach, see O. Fritsch et al., ‘Comparing the content of regulatory impact assessments in the UK 
and EU’ (2013) Public Money & Management 445. 
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movement, with the UK and EU having long committed to shareholder empowerment or 
‘real shareholder democracy’ as being an integral part of their corporate governance 
framework and an important political goal.180 
 While there is certainly value to be had from policies that are based on longer-term 
strategic planning, regulators should ensure that RA documents clearly reference these 
background contexts, thereby avoiding the impression that a proposed set of provisions is 
solely based on the weighing of costs and benefits – or positive and negative impacts – in 
the specific case. This would also facilitate the process of RA, freeing the actors that 
engage in it to acknowledge uncertainties and controversies but still go ahead with a policy 
by explaining the broader principles and aims that it supports. Alternatively, however, it 
would be even more desirable if RA could challenge these ingrained regulatory logics, 
instead of confirming them. However, at least in the corporate area, this is not presently the 
case. Indeed, given the above mentioned issues, RA is more in danger of becoming a form 
of rhetoric designed to advance already selected policy positions that are based on 
empirically ungrounded assumptions. 
 A related but distinct issue is that RA may also serve as a tool to confirm pre-existing 
beliefs on the part of regulators (and the public). In particular, despite its potential to 
mitigate such problems,181 RA may suffer from varying degrees of underlying confirmation 
bias. Decision-making experts such as Daniel Kahnemann have suggested that in order to 
                                                 
180 For example, see European Commission, ‘Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate 
Governance in the European Union – A Plan to Move Forward’ COM(2003) 284, 14. 
181 See 000–000 above.  
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overcome inherent biases, decision-makers should among others aim to explore dissenting 
opinions and views, explore credible alternatives, and be cautious about making overly 
optimistic forecasts.182 Similarly, this would also assist in countering public biases and 
regulatory positions and logics. Executive remuneration, for instance, is particularly prone 
to lead the public to false assumptions about its relative importance for shareholders, and 
the economy at large. Remuneration is typically small relative to a company’s overall 
value, meaning that reductions in pay awards are unlikely to affect share prices.183 
Additionally, the impact of changes in the size and design of remuneration packages on 
company value is far from clear, not to mention that high salaries in non-corporate areas 
(such as in the entertainment industry or sports) remain largely unquestioned.  
 Theoretically, in the jurisdictions considered in this article, RA is already designed 
along the lines of such considerations. Nevertheless, there is room left for improvement in 
practice. Using the UK as an example, RA should be conducted at an early stage in the 
regulatory process to maximise its influence, consultation outcomes should be taken into 
account in greater depth, and evidence bases and analyses should be deepened.184     
                                                 
182 See D. Kahnemann et al., ‘The Big Idea: Before You Make That Big Decision…’ (2011) 
89 Harvard Business Law Review 51. 
183 See, for example, A. Lund, ‘Say on Pay’s Bundling Problems’ (2011) 99 Kentucky Law Journal 
119, 136 n 5 (referring to the ‘relatively small magnitude of executive compensation relative to 
most firms’ balance sheets). For a critical take on executive remuneration in general, see M. Dorff, 
Indispensable and Other Myths: Why the CEO Pay Experiment Failed and How to Fix it (Berkeley 
et al: University of California Press, 2014). 
184 Additional details are discussed below, 000–000. 
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 Generally, the solution to decision-making in contentious areas and in the face of 
potential biases lies in transparency, the willingness to acknowledges uncertainties, 
concerted efforts to develop an informed, balanced view, and willingness on the part of 
regulators to accept RA outcomes that suggest that no action or an action that is contrary to 
what initially had been proposed should be taken. Moreover, in highly debated areas, 
legislative guidance may be needed in determining which variables RA should examine 
and, in particular, whose benefits should be prioritised. In corporate law, one of the 
questions that may arise (and could be addressed by the legislature) is whether the interests 
of investors, managers, consumer, other stakeholders, or society at large should be at the 
centre of a new policy initiative. Relatedly, the question may arise whether costs of 
regulated businesses should be weighed against benefits accruing to investors, other 
stakeholders, or society at large.185  
 Finally, another tool for countering confirmation biases is judicial review. While this 
has not been a major factor in Europe, it has drawn considerable attention in the US. 
Nevertheless, the question remains how a court can – and indeed why it should – make 
potentially far reaching decisions on contentious corporate governance questions. In this 
vein, some US commentators have already suggested limiting judicial oversight to reduce 
legal uncertainty and balancing it with increased statutory directives and legislative power 
over agencies.186 Indeed, strengthening the RA process, in conjunction with targeted 
                                                 
185 For an in-depth discussion, see Y. A. Lee, ‘The Efficiency Criterion for Securities Regulation: 
Investor Welfare or Cost-Benefit Analysis?’ (2015) 57 Arizona Law Review 85.  
186 See Fish, n 111 above, 727, 730; J. C. Coffee, Jr., ‘The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why 
Financial Reform Tends to be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated’ (2012) 97 Cornell Law 
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guidance by democratically legitimised legislative bodies in appropriate cases, seems to 
represent a superior approach than reliance on intervention by courts. 
(B) A revised view – RA as process 
Given the challenges of RA in corporate law, the question arises what remains in terms of 
value for this tool and what its future role should be. To elucidate this question, we should 
first recall the reasons for having RA in the first place. As discussed, major justifications, 
particularly form a US perspective, include those that focus on efficiency, social welfare, 
reduction of cognitive biases, and priority setting. It has also been noted – as a criticism or 
positive aspect, depending on the viewpoint – that RA slows down the regulatory process.  
 In the corporate context, it is questionable whether or to what extent these major 
functions are applicable. Without reliable data and given the difficulties in predicting the 
precise impact of proposed regulations, achieving efficiency is a goal that is hard to 
achieve, with the same being true for overall well-being. Moreover, RA is theoretically 
well-suited to reduce cognitive biases on the part of the public and regulators. With regards 
to the latter, however, existing weaknesses in RA procedures and various interconnections 
with political agendas suggest that RA is not the neutral, analysis-driven tool that it appears 
to be. Furthermore, there is also no clear evidence showing that RA influences regulatory 
pace or limits regulatory intervention. If used as a promotional tool, RA may even 
                                                                                                                                                    
Review 1019, 1080. See also Coates, n 6 above; D.M. Nagy, ‘The Costs of Mandatory Cost-Benefit 
Analysis in SEC Rulemaking’ (2015) 57 Arizona Law Review 129 (both arguing against US 
proposals to impose certain forms of mandatory CBA on rulemaking agencies). 
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contribute to more, rather than less, regulation, especially where benefits are emphasised 
over costs or negative impacts. As seen in the examples discussed above, the proposition 
that RA favours the status quo is therefore not generally accurate. 
 However, RA also has the potential to increase transparency and information, facilitate 
monitoring of regulators, and provide factors for decision-making. These functions, 
although they are not without their own challenges, provide a sounder basis going forward 
in thinking about RA in corporate law and also offer a compelling argument in favour of 
RA. Taking a view that stands between approaches that promote strictly cost-benefit  and 
efficiency driven regulation and those that reject this very idea, this article suggests that RA 
should be understood not as being dependent on a specific normative criterion – such as 
efficiency, social welfare, better ‘quality’, etc. – but as an iterative process. Thus, RA is 
less about providing substantive answers and should be conceptualised primarily as an 
informational tool for the public and regulators, who can see the reasoning and evidence 
behind regulatory action and are provided with participatory opportunities. RA thereby also 
contributes to transparency and monitoring of regulators. Viewed this way, and contrary to 
what some critics believe, RA is a useful tool, albeit in ways that differ from what it is 
commonly expected to achieve. 
 As discussed, RA is not identical with strict cost-benefit analysis and does not 
necessarily result in net beneficial rules in the traditional, economic sense. The exact details 
in this regard depend on the statutory or other basis on which RA is conducted, but at least 
where regulators are directed to ‘consider’ costs and benefits or ‘assess’ the impacts of a 
policy, it is mistaken to expect a rigid cost-benefit analysis. Where traditional CBA is used, 
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it should act as a guide, but not trump other considerations.187 Generally, policies should 
pass a cost-benefit analysis or have positive impacts that outweigh negative impacts. 
However, should this not be the case a policy may still be recommended, although this 
requires detailed explanations, stating the reasons for the decision,188 which could be 
related to public policy or specific distributive considerations. In the corporate law context, 
for instance, the government could see compelling reasons for wealth distributions from 
one constituency to another constituency.189 For instance, a rule might transfer wealth from 
managers to shareholders, potentially even without creating new value or reducing cost. In 
such and similar scenarios (and whether one agrees with the rule’s policy thrust or not), 
thorough explanations of a policy’s underlying considerations are preferable over regulators 
having to justify their actions strictly based on cost-benefit ratios or prevalence of positive 
impacts, which invites biased assessments.  
 This article thus stands in contrast to criticisms such as by Jeffrey Gordon, who views 
CBA in financial regulation as ‘a serious category mistake’ and ‘conceptually 
wrongheaded’.190 The claim made here is that RA in the corporate context – including CBA 
                                                 
187 See also Ahdieh, n 45 above, 2071, who distinguishes between economic analysis and policy 
choice, opining that while regulators should be expected to conduct rigorous CBA, their ultimate 
regulatory choices should not be limited to the outcomes dictated by that analysis. 
188 See Hahn & Sunstein, n 12 above, 1495–1499, 1527–1529 (suggesting, among others, that 
regulators should not be bound by bottom-line numbers and that in certain cases qualitative 
considerations and distributive impacts may justify policies that have higher costs than benefits).  
189 See Lee, n 185 above, 88. 
190 Gordon, n 22 above, 352.  
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as one of its elements – is a useful tool, albeit in ways that differ from what it is commonly 
expected to achieve, including the idea that RA should support a particular normative 
criterion. The approach suggested herein acknowledges the need for regulatory flexibility, 
similar to what Jeffrey Gordon refers to as the ‘pragmatics of regulatory judgment’.191 Yet, 
while Gordon rejects CBA and calls for an entirely ‘different regulatory model’192 based on 
these pragmatics, this article’s position is that CBA remains an important, albeit not 
decisive, element of RA, which should combine quantification and ‘pragmatics’.  
 Gordon’s ‘regulatory judgment’ is akin to what regulators and other academics have 
also referred to as ‘professional judgment’ or ‘expert judgment’. In recent work, John 
Coates makes the point that expert judgment is an unavoidable component of quantified 
CBA given that this tool is bound to produce unreliable results. However, at the same time 
he also stresses that experts can – and often do – err in their judgment.193 In order to 
improve what he perceives as a weak status quo, Coates therefore focuses on improvements 
to CBA as a method, including how to account for  the costs and benefits of CBA itself. 
Coates puts hardly any weight on informational and procedural benefits of CBA (and RA in 
general), the exception being transparency, which however is only discussed in terms of 
                                                 
191 ibid 375. 
192 ibid. Although Gordon suggests that regulators should not ‘give up on the project of applied 
consequentialism’, he maintains that ‘the critical judgments ought not to be made on the basis of 
[CBA] but rather in light of normative principles.’ ibid 374.  
193 Coates, n 6 above, 903–904. See also Sunstein, n 152 above (suggesting decision-making 
strategies for agencies when quantification of costs/benefits and break-even analyses are not 
feasible); Office of Management and Budget, Circular A-4, above n 15. 
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precision and reliability in conducting CBA.194 Coates’ critique of CBA is so severe that it 
has been interpreted to mean that ‘regulators should not engage in CBA’.195 Although this 
is incorrect – Coates argues for an improvement, not abandonment of CBA – it remains 
unclear what he suggests as the way forward given that he believes that CBA will produce 
unreliable results for the foreseeable future but also sees alternative modes of evaluation 
and expert judgment as flawed and inferior to reliable CBA.   
 The common theme in Gordon’s and Coates’ work is that they identify weaknesses in 
corporate/financial law CBA. As a result, the proposed course of action is to either abolish 
CBA (Gordon) or to mostly refrain from using it until it is improved, although with unclear 
implications (Coates). While improvements to CBA would obviously be a welcome 
development, the approach proposed in this article presents a third way, one in which these 
weaknesses are not fatal as the function of RA is seen as going beyond quantification. 
Regulators that engage in good faith efforts to quantify and assess regulatory impacts, and 
consult with interested parties, still contribute to RA’s beneficial informational and 
transparency functions. With the appropriate disclosures, this is true even when RA 
evaluates alternatives and helps design the details of what in reality may well relate to 
policies whose main thrust has already been decided upon. Admittedly, the informational 
function emphasised herein is put at risk by distorted information and biases that affect RA. 
However, these issues can be mitigated through other measures suggested herein, including 
                                                 
194 More precise quantification should lead to enhanced transparency and vice versa. See Coates, n 6 
above, 888, 889–890. 
195 Posner & Weyl, n 7 above, 246. 
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a relaxed focus on quantification, enhanced transparency and deeper engagement, and 
external inputs during and after the RA process.196  
 Accepting – or, in Gordon’s case, demanding – the inclusion of regulatory judgment in 
RA invokes yet another issue: the question of independence between the technocratic 
regulatory and political sphere.197 One response in reforming RA could be to call for a 
stronger decoupling from politics. While value neutral policy-making may represent a 
realistic and aspirational goal in other fields, it is uncertain whether this would be desirable 
and, indeed, practically possible in corporate law.198 ‘Regulatory’ or similarly labelled 
judgements are bound to contain varying degrees of political judgments. Given the 
constraints outlined above, completely value neutral decision-making purely based on 
expected regulatory effects remains illusory and may not even be desirable or in accordance 
with democratic principles that mandate governments to pursue certain policies. Thus, these 
systemic realities should be accepted since it is not that they are truly troubling, but rather 
                                                 
196 See 000–000 and 000–000. 
197 On this and the concept of ‘rational policy-making’ see Radaelli & de Francesco, n 1 above.  
198 See also text to n 180 above. On the interconnections between politics and corporate 
(governance) law, see generally M. Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of 
American Corporate Finance Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); P.A. Gourevitch 
& J. Shinn, Political Power and Corporate Control: The New Global Politics of Corporate 
Governance (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); C. Bruner, Corporate Governance in the 
Common-Law World (Cambridge et al.: CUP, 2013). As two commentators have noted, corporate 
law may also contain a ‘folkloristic’ element. M. Kahan & E. B. Rock, ‘Symbolic Corporate 
Governance Politics’ (2014) 94 Boston University Law Review 1997.  
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instances where RA is used to mask these realities. Indeed, criticisms of RA’s alleged anti-
regulatory tendency are imprecise – in truth, the issue that these criticisms apparently decry 
is that RA may be used to hide politically motivated decisions.199  
 Having framed RA more heavily in terms of its procedural and informational functions, 
some important guiding themes emerge. Those conducting and using RA should quantify 
and engage in economic analysis but, at the same time, be given sufficient leeway to 
exercise judgement, which would also alleviate at least some of the problems related to the 
formal or informal requirement to quantify costs, benefits, or impacts. They should also be 
allowed to define, to an appropriate extent, the fine line between economic analysis and 
policy choice.200 In return, those in charge of RA also need to strive for an encompassing, 
open-minded, transparent, and engaged process, which maximises meaningful third party 
input and avoids using RA as camouflage.  
 For instance, current procedures could be bolstered by introducing ex ante control in the 
form of stringent independent studies and quality checks. Depending on the importance of 
an initiative, this could be conducted through independent intra-governmental bodies and 
additionally through outside panels comprised of experts with different backgrounds and 
                                                 
199 To clarify, RA in the EU is by design clearly subordinated to political decisions, meaning that its 
outcome or finalised assessment is a political decision-making aid. However, the judgment referred 
to in this paragraph is judgment exercised as part of the RA process, where its occurrence might 
come as a surprise given that RA appears to be of a purely objective, impact-driven (or cost-benefit 
driven) nature. Yet, it is already in this first layer where RA may be influenced by politics and 
policy. See also Lianos & Fazeka, n 54 above, 8–12 (discussing impact assessments and politics). 
200 With regards to the SEC’s rulemaking, see Kraus & Raso, n 112 above. 
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viewpoints. These bodies and panels’ scrutiny and normative assessment of proposed 
policies should go far beyond what can be seen in studies such as the one commissioned as 
part of the EU’s non-financial disclosure rules process.201 Additionally, the EU and UK 
should strive for deeper engagement with comments received during the consultation phase, 
which also ties in to the point made earlier regarding the need for greater critical analysis in 
these jurisdictions’ RA process. 
 Moreover, ex post control mechanisms should be further strengthened and used to 
implement appropriate tweaks and changes to recently adopted policies. Implementation 
reviews and re-assessments based on newly available information and surveys, as in part 
already envisaged in the jurisdictions discussed herein, are the correct starting point.202 
These reviews could be further extended, such as by using external peer reviews,203 
particularly in the area of highly contentious or uncertain fields of policy-making. In short, 
with the substantive methods of how to conduct RA already being at a comparatively 
                                                 
201 CSES, n 144 above, which assessed quantified costs and benefits based on a small number of 
responses from businesses that responded to a questionnaire. 
202 Roberta Romano has formulated a farther reaching ‘sunset’ proposal for certain financial 
regulation policies, which she suggests should be phased-out unless re-enacted by regulators. 
R. Romano, ‘Regulating in the Dark’, in: C. Coglianese, ed., Regulatory Breakdown: The Crisis of 
Confidence in U.S. Regulation (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 2012). For a critique 
of this, see Coffee, n 186 above. 
203 See K. Arrow et al., Benefit-Cost Analysis in Environmental, Health, and Safety Regulation 
(AEI: Washington, D.C, 1996) 9. 
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advanced stage, increased efforts spent on improving RA procedure appear more goal-
oriented and will likely lead to larger incremental improvements going forward. 
(A) CONCLUSION 
RA has significant potential to support the regulatory process. Examining the field of 
corporate law and focusing on three recent case studies, however, this article has argued 
that RA does not live up to several important expectations that regulators and 
commentators often ascribe to this tool. In the corporate context, namely the promises of 
efficiency, social welfare, and reduced biases through RA tend to be thwarted by problems 
relating to prediction and quantification of future events as well as the general inability of 
traditional RA to be an appropriate arbiter of disagreements over fundamental corporate 
governance questions. These flaws may prove fatal for the accuracy of the whole exercise 
of conducting RA and endanger its utility and credibility. 
 Inherent uncertainties, false certainty, and the potential for camouflage and promotional 
overreach signify that the traditional view of RA needs to be adjusted. While improving the 
substance of RA remains a valid goal, the political nature of many important corporate law 
issues also signifies the need for RA to incorporate leeway for properly disclosed and 
reasonable regulatory judgments. Thus, properly understood, the function of RA is in great 
part procedural in nature, which is why procedure – namely in the form of consultation, 
critical engagement, clarity in underlying goals, and review – needs to be RA’s major focal 
point. While this may not directly result in the most efficient or ‘best’ policies, it will 
facilitate information, transparency, and monitoring. Ultimately, however, RA strengthened 
along these lines will indirectly lead to more reasoned and legitimised corporate law 
policies. 
